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ABSTRACT 
Countering current practice in investment treaty arbitration, 
the 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) authorizes 
investors to raise a claim in investment treaty arbitration using 
direct recourse arbitration for a breach of a category of contracts 
called “investment agreements,” corresponding to natural resource 
and public service concessions and infrastructure projects.  I 
analyze the consent clause for investment agreement claim 
arbitration in the context of the evolution of dispute resolution of 
transnational contracts between States and investors with 
particular emphasis on the recent controversy in investment treaty 
arbitration over contract claims, and discuss some of the 
implications for States which commit to the investment agreement 
provisions of the consent clause.  A wide range of government 
administrative actions affecting foreign investment, including non-
discriminatory regulations for public welfare purposes, could 
become forms of compensable liability that are currently not 
considered to be international wrongdoing under customary 
international law or in contemporary BIT practice under the 
investment agreement arbitration consent clause.  Given the 
theoretical problems with the judicial administration of contract 
claims in treaty arbitration and the potential conflict with States’ 
rights to regulate, particularly in the field of environmental law, I 
advocate a narrow construction of the investment agreement 
provisions to reconcile them with customary international law and 
investment arbitration practice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether an investor may litigate breaches of 
concession contracts through investment treaty arbitration has 
generated heated controversy1 in treaty arbitration in recent years, 
echoing a dispute between developed and developing countries 
over the proper forum for the adjudication of concession 
agreements for natural resource extraction that stretches back at 
least a century.2  The United States has addressed this question 
quite specifically in the dispute resolution clause of its latest 
 
1 See generally Stanimir Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty: 
The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract 
Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 
557 (2004) (discussing two contradicting holdings reached by the SGS tribunal in 
deciding whether a tribunal set up by a investment treaty can exercise jurisdiction 
on breaches of contract claims where there is an umbrella clause); Christopher 
Schreuer, Investment Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims: the Vivendi I 
Case Considered, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING 
CASES FROM ICSID, NAFTA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 281, 281–324 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); Emmanuel Gaillard, 
Investment Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims: the SGS Cases Considered 
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM ICSID, 
NAFTA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
Supra, at 325, 325–46; Jared Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and 
Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 
(2006) (contending that a BIT tribunal has jurisdiction over breach-of-contract 
claims since the umbrella clause applies to investor-states, and that such a tribunal 
can exercise such jurisdiction notwithstanding an exclusive forum selection clause 
designating a different forum); Michael D. Nolan & Edward G. Baldwin, The 
Treatment of Contract-Related Claims in Treaty-based Arbitration, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. 
REP., June 2006, at 19 (noticing that many issues still arise as to how tribunals in 
BIT-based arbitrations will handle private-law contract claims). 
2 See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 20–24 
(2d ed. 2004) (reviewing methods including bilateral treaties that developed in 
international law to protect foreign investment by multinational corporations and 
the problems associated with such protections); North American Dredging 
Company of Texas (United States) v. Mexico (1926), 4 REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 26 
(General Claims Commission 1926) (noting that the legal controversy as to 
whether contracts with foreign investors may be adjudicated outside of national 
court systems started in the Americas in the late 19th century with the Calvo 
doctrine, entering into international relations between the developed countries 
and the Middle East, Asia and Africa mainly after WWII: according to the Calvo 
doctrine, in matters of host State interference with foreign property, the foreign 
party must assert a claim in domestic courts under host State laws). 
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prototype for its Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) and 
Investment Chapters of Free Trade Agreements, the U.S. 2004 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (“the Model BIT”).3  Already 
incorporated in nine investment treaty arrangements negotiated by 
the U.S. beginning with the Singapore FTA4 in 2002, the dispute 
resolution clause of the Model BIT (“DRC”),5 contains specific 
procedures for the arbitration of certain transnational concession 
contract claims, procedures that stand to challenge national 
administrative law systems and impose de facto constraints on 
signatory States’ prerogative to regulate for the health, safety and 
welfare of their citizens. 
Countering the current majority practice disfavoring the 
arbitration of contract claims as such in investment treaty tribunals, 
the DRC expressly authorizes qualified investors of the Treaty 
Parties to raise a claim in investment treaty arbitration for a breach 
of a category of contracts called “investment agreements,” 
corresponding to agreements for natural resource and public 
service concessions and public infrastructure projects.  In this 
Article I analyze the DRC expressing the advance consent of the 
treaty parties to arbitrate investment agreement claims and discuss 
some of their implications for States who would commit to the 
provisions.  In view of the theoretical difficulties with arbitrating 
contract claims in treaty tribunals as well as the barriers these 
provisions raise to environmental protection in particular, I argue 
for a narrow interpretation of the provisions based on precedents 
in investment treaty arbitration and customary international law. 
According to the subject matter jurisdiction clause in Article 24 
of the DRC, in the event an “investment dispute” cannot be 
reconciled, a claimant may, “(a) on its own behalf or (b) on behalf 
of an enterprise . . . that the claimant owns or controls directly or 
indirectly,” submit a claim “(i) that the respondent has 
 
3 Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of [Country] concerning the encouragement and reciprocal 
protection investment [hereinafter Model BIT], available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf. 
4 The counterparty countries are Oman, Singapore, Chile, Uruguay, Rwanda, 
Colombia, Morocco, Panama, Korea and Peru.  The provisions were also 
incorporated in CAFTA.  Dominican Republic—Central America—United States 
Free Trade Agreement art. 20, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov 
/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file85_3940.pdf. 
5 See Model BIT, supra note 3, Section B. 
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breached . . . (C) an investment agreement; and (ii) that the 
enterprise has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out 
of, that breach . . . .” 
As with many modern BITs, the Model BIT authorizes an 
investor of one treaty party to make a claim directly against the 
host State of investment in an international arbitration tribunal 
through the advance expression of consent to such claims by the 
host State (this is sometimes called direct recourse arbitration or 
“arbitration without privity”).6  Such an award is not appealable by 
national courts.  It is subject at most to internal review by the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”),7  or it may be challenged at the enforcement stage for 
limited causes. Recognized within the ambit of the United Nations 
Convention for the Enforcement and Recognition for Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (“the New York Convention”)8 the awards of an 
 
6 See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT L.J. 232, 233 (1995) (“By allowing direct recourse by private 
complainants with respect to such a wide range of issues, these [multilateral] 
treaties create a dramatic extension of arbitral jurisdiction in the international 
realm.”). 
7 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 
159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].  When the parties to the dispute choose the 
ICSID rules for dispute settlement under the treaty, article 52 of the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (“the ICSID Convention”) applies, limiting all forms of review to the ICSID 
Annulment Procedure, which states that a decision may be annulled if an Ad Hoc 
Committee finds: 
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; 
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure; or 
(e) that the award has failed to State the reasons on which it is based. 
8 See Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 34.9 (“A disputing party may seek 
enforcement of an arbitration award under the ICSID Convention or the New 
York Convention [or the Inter-American Convention] regardless of whether 
proceedings have been taken under paragraph 8.”); Convention on the 
Enforcement and Recognition for Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that a country may refuse to recognize an 
award under limited circumstances). 
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arbitration tribunal founded under the Model BIT must be 
enforced by the mandate of the treaty.9  A party may also seek 
enforcement in the national courts under the convention 
establishing ICSID.10 
While the Model BIT and the new treaties based on it are not 
unique in authorizing the resolution of disputes arising out of 
contracts in an international tribunal,11 they are apparently the first 
to specifically require the settlement of a claim for a breach of a 
concession contract with an investor under direct recourse 
arbitration pursuant to a consent clause.  Since concession 
agreements may provide for dispute resolution according to the 
laws of the host State under its judicial processes, the treaty 
provisions may allow investors ex post facto to circumvent the 
domestic courts, as though the parties had originally agreed upon 
international commercial arbitration for the settlement of disputes 
related to the contract instead.  When combined with the general 
duties for recognition and enforcement of awards in the treaty, the 
investment agreement claim provisions make the enforcement of 
the specific obligations in the investment agreement through treaty 
arbitration an international duty for which money damages is the 
principal remedy. 
 
9 See Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 34.7 (“Each Party shall provide for the 
enforcement of an award in its territory.”); id. art 37 (discussing state-state dispute 
settlement). 
10 See Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 24.3 (“Provided that six months have 
elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim 
referred to in paragraph 1 under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of 
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, provided that both the respondent and the 
non-disputing Party are parties to the ICSID Convention.”). 
11 See, e.g., Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria, 1 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1981); Declaration of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the 
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran art. 2, sec. 1, 1 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
9 (1981). Collectively called the Algiers Accord, these conventions created the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and vested the tribunal with jurisdiction to 
deal with disputes arising over contracts.  However, the contracts to be resolved 
under the treaty were those for which the parties were either both private entities 
or both governments.  Thus, when a State party was involved in a dispute with an 
alien of another country concerning a contract, the claims alleged expropriation 
under international law with contractual rights as the object of expropriation, 
rather than breach of contract as such. 
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As treaty tribunals have declined to make awards solely on the 
basis of the breach of a State contract12 to this point,13 the 
investment agreement claims provisions create an entirely new 
remedy in investment treaty arbitration, one that has strong 
potential to conflict with the normal regulatory and administrative 
functions in the areas of public contracting, environmental 
regulation and the disposition of natural resources of host States.  
The prospective clash with host State administrative law originates 
in the open-ended language of the consent clause including the 
award clause,14 that could impose compensable liability on a much 
wider range of State conduct than in either current investment 
treaty claims or international law claims arising from the 
discriminatory breach of contract with an alien.  Under a broad 
interpretation yet one that is not far from the plain meaning of the 
text, unanticipated non-discriminatory regulation of the host State 
for legitimate public purposes would require financial 
compensation to the investor for any compliance costs incidentally 
incurred to an investment under the concession contract, extending 
potentially to foregone profits.15  Investors would not need to 
demonstrate conduct that amounted to a violation of customary 
international law or the treaty to obtain relief.  In addition, if the 
investment agreement contains a stabilization clause, host States 
could face much tighter constraints in policy and be more 
frequently obliged to compensate for regulation.16  Faced with such 
 
12 I take State contract to mean a contract between a State and an alien 
investor in the general sense. 
13 But see Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland (Neth. v. Pol.), Partial Award and 
Dissenting Opinion, para. 262, 12 ICSID (W. Bank) 335 (2005) (granting plaintiff 
remedy on the grounds that Poland had breached its contractual duties under the 
investment agreement).  This is the only case I know of in which a breach of 
contract was deemed an independent cause for compensation in an investment 
treaty arbitration.  The breach of a contract was deemed a breach of the treaty’s 
umbrella clause and consequently was found to be a compensable breach of the 
treaty.  However, no decision on the measure of damages was rendered and 
annulment has been applied for.  See the Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-Pol., Sept. 7, 1992, 2240 U.N.T.S. 387 
for specific provisions of the treaty. 
14 See infra Section 4.1. 
15 Id. 
16 See discussion infra Section 2.3; Lorenzo Cotula, Regulatory Takings, 
Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development (March 27–28, 2008) (paper 
submitted for the OECD Global Forum on International Investment VII), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/8/40311122.pdf (“Compared to 
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legal sanctions arising from these treaty commitments, developing 
countries I argue will rationally opt to forego promulgating or 
enforcing environmental and social legislation applying to 
investment agreements to the detriment of environmental 
governance and sustainable development. 
The introduction of contract claim arbitration into treaty 
tribunals raises many theoretical difficulties from the point of view 
of judicial administration as well.  These dilemmas stem from 
direct jurisdictional conflicts with domestic tribunals as well as the 
governing law provisions of the investment agreement claim that 
allow international law to be applied to aspects of the contract 
claim.  Also, without any precedent in public international law for 
contractual remedies as such, the provisions raise the specter of a 
new hybrid-variety of contractual remedies grounded neither in 
public international law nor in domestic contract law.  Such 
uncertainties could ultimately undermine the predictability and 
stability that are the goals of the U.S. Model BIT. 
Before discussing the text of the investment agreement 
provisions of the DRC, I place the investment agreement 
provisions in their legal and historical context with an overview of 
the dispute resolution of transnational concession contracts.  The 
investment agreement provisions are a compromise proposal in a 
historical debate on the internationalization of concession contracts 
and a response to more recent objections to the arbitration of 
concession contracts in investment tribunals.  In Section 2, I sketch 
briefly the well-documented twentieth century evolution of 
various theories internationalization17 of concession contracts 
advocated by capital-exporting countries and opposing doctrines 
favored by capital-importing countries.  Then, after reviewing 
some general public international law principles regarding 
contracts between States and alien investors and the legal 
framework for investment treaty arbitration, in Section 3 I review 
the holdings of recent influential BIT arbitrations on the treatment 
of contract claims in treaty tribunals.  Section 4 presents the key 
provisions of the DRC relating to investment agreements.  In this 
Section I highlight how the investment agreement provisions of the 
DRC leave unresolved several of the objections to treaty arbitration 
 
regulatory takings doctrine and despite significant variation across contracts, 
stabilization clauses tend to significantly lower the threshold beyond which host 
states must pay compensation.”). 
17 SORNARAJAH, supra note 2. 
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of contract claims discussed in the investment treaty awards in 
Section 3.  Finally, in Section 5, I explore in more detail the scope 
and implications of the conflict between the investment agreement 
provisions and the exercise of police powers by host States.  I 
propose a narrower interpretation of the DRC in line with the 
customary international law of state contracts and investment 
treaty arbitration practice that is consistent with the international 
law prerogative of states to regulate for the public welfare.  Section 
6 concludes. 
2. THEORIES ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF STATE 
CONTRACTS 
It is common for foreign investors who undertake a foreign 
investment project to bargain for an agreement with the host 
government granting rights or promising some measure of support 
for the carrying-out of the project.  Even though in some 
investment situations, host State promises may only negligibly 
influence a foreigner’s decision to invest, more acute situations 
arise in long-term, capital intensive projects where public services 
are provided or natural resources extracted in close cooperation 
with the host State.  It is then impossible to discount the 
significance of promises made in such contracts for an investor’s 
decision to pledge resources.  At the same time, a breach of an 
agreement upon which such a long-term investment is based can 
result in significant losses for sunken costs that may not be fully 
recoverable against a host State in the host State’s court system.  
There is also the problem of the obsolescing bargain:18 the 
bargaining power of the investor is at its apex just before the 
conclusion of the agreement while the host State is seeking to 
induce capital, technology and know-how; afterwards the host 
State has incentives to unilaterally revise its terms. 
Nevertheless, when a host government entity enters into a 
contract with an investor, the investor may be required to raise his 
or her grievance in the tribunals of the host State if a conflict arises, 
either because domestic law requires it or because the host State 
 
18 Raymond Vernon, International Investment and International Trade in the 
Product Cycle, 80 Q.J. ECON. 190 (1966) (using tools such as the timing of 
innovation, the effects of scale economies, and the roles of ignorance and 
uncertainty to analyze the shifts in international trade and international 
investment). 
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had superior bargaining power in the negotiations.  From the 
investor’s point of view, this means the investor may face 
potentially biased host government institutions in the investment 
process, which may at various stages depend critically on the 
administrative decisions of the host State and/or be significantly 
affected by legislative changes in the legal framework of the 
investment.  When an irreconcilable dispute over such a project 
arises, should an investor be able to bring a claim for breach of 
contract against a government in a public international forum such 
as a treaty tribunal? 
The problem of how to protect foreign investments within a 
host country’s legal system has been an ongoing concern for capital 
exporting countries since a series of nationalizations of petroleum 
concessions in the Middle East in the middle of the last century.  
Dissatisfied with the compensation from national tribunals for 
those expropriations and simultaneously faced with the collapse of 
the legal and political controls supporting traditional concession 
agreements after the Second World War, capital-exporting 
countries advanced various legal theories to afford concession 
contracts external legal protection outside of the host State legal 
system, that is, to “internationalize” them.19  Accordingly, since the 
1950s legal practitioners and academics from the capital-exporting 
countries have developed and propounded an alternative body of 
transnational contract law to apply to concession agreements that 
displaces or supplements national law, drawing inspiration, in 
many cases, from previously failed attempts to bring contract 
claims before the ICJ and other international tribunals.  These 
theories surfaced in the ad hoc arbitrations following the petroleum 
nationalizations,20 in which arbitrators grappled with the 
 
19 See A.F.M. Maniruzzuman, State Contracts in Contemporary International 
Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 309, 309 (2001) (defining 
internationalization as a theory that “suggests that, no matter what law the parties 
to such a contract choose as the proper law of the contract, international law 
superimposes their choice and applies automatically as the overriding governing 
law”). 
20 See Sapphire Int. Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. (Sapphire), 35 
I.L.R. 136 (Arb. Trib. 1963) (documenting a case that occurred in the 1960s as a 
result of the second oil nationalization in Iran).  See also British Petroleum 
Exploration Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic (BP v. Libya), 53 I.L.R. 297 (Arb. Trib. 
1973); Texaco Overseas Petroleum Corp. v. Libyan Arab Republic (TOPCO), 53 
I.L.R. 389 (Arb. Trib. 1977); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic 
(LIAMCO), 20 I.L.M. 1 (Arb. Trib. 1981) (documenting the cases that the Libyan 
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interpretation and legal nature of a generation of petroleum 
concession agreements. 
Internationalization was seen as all the more urgent by capital 
exporting companies as a developing country consensus had 
coalesced in the UN to recognize sovereign rights over the 
disposition of natural resources and a sovereign right to 
autonomous economic development.  Over time, this competing 
norm of permanent sovereign rights over natural resources21 was 
assimilated into the investment laws and constitutions of several 
developing countries.  The strengthening of host State autonomy 
and supervision over concession contracts led capital exporting 
States to turn increasingly to investment treaties to secure 
protection for concession contracts, a trend which accelerated in 
the 1990s amid the fervor worldwide for liberalization of 
investment and trade and transparency in governance.22 
2.1. Choice of Law Clauses and Forum Selection Clauses 
Many advocates of the concept of internationalization have 
contended that by designating international law in the place of the 
domestic contract law as the governing law of the concession 
contract, and by choosing international arbitration in the forum 
selection clause, the host State will be bound under international 
law to the individual obligations in the agreement.23  The most 
 
oil industry nationalization in 1970 gave rise to); Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co. 
(AMINOIL), 21 I.L.M. 976 (Arb. Trib. 1982) (describing the ad hoc proceedings on 
compensation for nationalization that occurred in response to Kuwait’s 
termination of a 1948 oil concession in favor of an American company); Saudi 
Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117 (Arb. Trib. 1963) 
(involving another arbitration concerning breach of a concession agreement). 
21 See G.A. Res. 626 (VII), U.N. Doc. A/2361 (Dec. 21, 1952), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/7/ares7.htm (detailing the “right to 
exploit freely natural wealth and resources”); G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. 
A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/17 
/ares17.htm (describing states’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources). 
22 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], State Contracts, at 6, U.N. 
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/11, U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D.5 (2005) (“State 
contracts and the conflict of doctrines associated with them may be seen as a core 
purpose of making investment treaties.”). 
23 See Robert Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 156, 156 (1961) (examining “[h]ow far a sovereign State which enters into a 
contract with an alien becomes subject thereby to obligations of public 
international law”). 
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common version of this theory assumes the existence of a kind of 
universal private international law of contract outside of either 
municipal law or public international law based on international 
commercial practice, a modern lex mercatoria, that applies to 
transnational concession contracts between alien investors and 
States.  Proponents of this transnational law of State contracts have 
stressed the binding effects of selected general principles of law as 
referred to in Art. 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.  In particular, they 
have relied heavily on pacta sunt servanda,24 as well as the 
requirement to observe good faith25 in contractual relationships 
and the doctrine of acquired rights.26  Although the concept of a 
universal private law based on international commercial practices 
has found almost universal acceptance in international sales and 
finance contracting between private parties and, to a lesser extent, 
in procurement contexts, the same has not been true for concession 
contracts.  Under concession contracts, the host State has 
traditionally enjoyed the rights of unilateral termination and 
modification and has encountered a standard of compensation for 
breach less than that for commercial contracts as a form of 
administrative contract.27 
An alternative justification for the belief that choice of law and 
arbitration clauses could achieve internationalization is a theory 
characterizing modern concession contracts as public international 
law agreements. 28  A minority of scholars argues that, by virtue of 
 
24 See Sapphire, 35 I.L.R at 181 (involving the principle that every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith; thereby implying that a party cannot invoke provisions of its municipal law 
as justification for a failure to perform). 
25 See Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., 23 I.L.M. 351 (1983).  See 
generally Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], , art. 1.7 (1994), 
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm 
(codifying the good faith principle). 
26 See Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117, 117 (Arb. Trib. 
1958). 
27 See Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International 
Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 657 (1999) (discussing the principle of lex mercatoria which refers to rules 
devised by the business community to regulate commercial activities, including 
the general principle of laws as well as codified principles, such as the UNIDROIT 
principles). 
28 See Prosper Weil, Problemes Relatifs aux Contrats Passés entre un Etat et un 
Particulier [Problems Concerning Contracts Between States and Private Parties], 128 
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the unique character of agreements for the extraction of natural 
resources under EDAs or “economic development agreements” or 
“investment agreements,”29 a breach of such an agreement would 
invoke State responsibility per se.  In the TOPCO arbitration, the 
sole arbitrator Dupuy followed this theory30 to conclude that a 
breach of an oil concession contract was internationally wrongful,31 
even though the governing law clause of the concession agreement 
at issue gave priority to domestic law.  This theory met the 
frequent objection that it would confer treaty status onto 
concession agreements and elevate the investor party to the 
contract to the status of a sovereign in international law. 
2.2 Umbrella Clauses 
As an alternative to contractual devices, capital-exporting 
countries sought to protect concession contracts through bilateral 
treaties.  The original vehicle for this was the “umbrella” or 
“obligations clause” which became a consistent feature of the new 
“investment protection treaties” introduced by Germany after 
WWII and later adapted by the UK and the U.S.32 to replace its 
 
RECUEIL DES COURS 95 (1969) (claiming that treaties may elevate contractual 
undertakings into international law obligations by stipulating that breach by one 
State of a contract with a private party from the other State will also constitute a 
breach of the treaty between the two States). 
29 See Stephem M. Schwebel, International Protection of Contractual 
Arrangements, PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 226, 269 (1959); Oyunchimeg Bordukh, 
Choice of Law in State Contracts in Economic Development Sector—Is There 
Party Autonomy? (2008) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Bond University) (on file with 
Bond University) (stating that EDAs “are not just a mere type of state contract 
made between a state or a state entity and a foreign national or a legal person of 
foreign nationality, rather [they] must satisfy certain criteria to be accepted as [a] 
foreign investment contract enforceable under international law”). 
30 See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Corp. v. Libya, Merits, 17 I.L.M. 1, para. 45 
(1977) (holding that the Libyan government breached an “internationalized” 
foreign investment contract). 
31 See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22) 
(involving a case wherein the British Government asserted this theory, but the 
Court declined jurisdiction); Memorial, 1952 I.C.J. 64, 74 (Feb. 4), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/16/8981.pdf (discussing the double 
character of the Concession Convention of 1933). 
32  See Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.–
Pan., Oct. 27, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1227; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.–Arm., Sept. 23, 1992, 1996 S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 103–11 (1993) (including umbrella clauses that were used in 
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Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.  Reproduced in 
various forms, umbrella clauses proliferated to such a degree that 
UNCITRAL has estimated that over forty percent of the more than 
2500 BITs in existence contain umbrella clauses.33  The first 
umbrella clause appeared in the 1957 Abs-Shawcross Draft 
Convention on Foreign Investment, 34  an early attempt to create a 
permanent international investment protection tribunal through a 
multilateral investment treaty.  That clause, Article II, reads: “Each 
Party shall at all times ensure the observance of any undertakings 
which it may have given in relation to investments made by 
nationals of any other party.”35 
The idea for umbrella clauses derived from a 1954 draft 
settlement agreement for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s claims 
regarding Iran’s oil nationalization program. 36  The settlement had 
created an “umbrella treaty” between Iran and the UK 
incorporating the private agreement between Iran and AIOC, such 
that a breach of the private agreement automatically became a 
breach of the treaty.  Accordingly, under an expansive 
contemporary interpretation of umbrella clauses in treaty 
arbitration, an umbrella clause in an investment treaty elevates a 
contract breach by a State to an international wrongdoing, 
regardless of the nature of the contract or the specific provision 
breached, and as a consequence, vests the treaty tribunal with 
subject matter jurisdiction for the contract claim.37  One investment 
 
negotiating treaties until NAFTA dropped the clause in 1994, along with any 
reference to contract claims). 
33 See Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment 
Agreements, (OECD Working Paper No. 3, 2006) (discussing examples of umbrella 
clauses, as well as the interpretation of umbrella clauses in investment 
agreements). 
34 See Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs/Shawcross), Apr. 1959, 
reprinted in 5 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM, 301 U.N. 
Doc. UNCTAD DITE/2 (2000). 
35 Id. art. 2. 
36 See Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the 
International Law of Investment Protection, 20 ARB. INT’L 411, 413–18 (2004) 
(describing the history and function of the umbrella clause).  See also Wong, supra 
note 1, at 137 (discussing the debates over the proper construction of the umbrella 
clause). 
37 See Thomas W. Wälde, The Umbrella (or Sanctity of Contract/Pacta sunt 
Servanda) Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and 
Recent Cases, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., Oct. 2004, available at 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/tv1-4 
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treaty tribunal went farther to state: “An umbrella clause is usually 
seen as transforming municipal law obligations into obligations 
directly cognizable in international law.”38 
Those who argue that umbrella clauses in investment treaties 
operate to attach State responsibility to a State contract breach39 
and those who argue internationalization could be achieved 
through a choice of law clause, tend to defend their positions on 
similar grounds.  They contend it was equitable to preserve a 
remedy when the host State retroactively uses its legislative or 
administrative powers to avoid or modify its obligations under a 
contract or otherwise interferes with the investor’s property rights 
in a manner that nevertheless accords with domestic law.40  Even if 
a State’s conduct does not rise to outright expropriation, it was 
desirable and equitable to protect the investor’s legitimate-
investment-backed expectations.41 Although less relevant today to 
 
-article_2.htm (commenting on the original intentions behind the umbrella 
clause). 
38 Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, para. 53 (Oct. 12, 
2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf. 
39  F. A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 241, 246 (1981): 
[I]t protects the investor against any interference with his contractual 
rights, whether it results from a mere breach of contract or a legislative 
or administrative act, and independently of whether or not such 
interference amounts to expropriation.  The variation of the terms of a 
contract or license by legislative measures, the termination of the 
contract or the failure to perform any of its terms, for instance, by non-
payment, the dissolution of the local company with which the investor 
may have contracted and the transfer of its assets (with or without the 
liabilities)—these and similar acts the treaties render wrongful. 
40 This was a central concern in the Sapphire arbitration.  Sapphire Int. 
Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (Int’l Arb. Trib. 1963).  These 
arguments had previously been used to justify the positions of the Swiss and 
French governments in the Losinger Case and the Norwegian Loan cases 
respectively.  Losinger Case (Switz. v. Yugo.), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 78 (June 
27); Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6).  In many if not most 
contemporary legal systems, public contracts contain a termination at will clause 
in favor of the government party.  See Derek W. Bowett, State Contracts with 
Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach, 59 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 49, 56–58 (1988) in which he discusses “termination at 
convenience clauses” in the United States and the U.K. 
41 Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., Final Award, 21 I.L.M. 976 (Int’l Arb. Trib. 
1982).  The norm of preserving legitimate-investment-backed expectations for 
concession projects has since independently become most progressively 
developed under the prohibition of uncompensated indirect expropriation and 
the fair and equitable treatment minimum treatment standard in BIT 
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post-independence developing countries, it was also argued that 
making specific contractual obligations binding through 
international law was necessary in areas of potential political 
turmoil with weak or incomplete systems of law. 
2.3. Stabilization Clauses in Investment Agreements 
A third theory by which State contracts could be 
internationalized was the use of a stabilization clause in the 
concession agreement.  In most newly independent capital-
importing countries, concession agreements in the oil sector 
underwent significant transformations in form after independence 
through renegotiation after nationalization, or by agreement in line 
with profound changes in the conditions in industry.  Consistent 
with the new legal relations between capital exporting countries 
and their former colonies, these changes reflected the fundamental 
shift in power in the developing countries over mineral rights.  
Traditionally no more than licenses to conduct economic activities 
within a territory in return for the remission of royalties, the new 
oil concession agreements emerged as complex structures with the 
investor agreeing to provide technical assistance and training and 
major infrastructural inputs on a long-term basis in cooperation 
with the host State.  Most commonly taking the form of product-
sharing agreements in the oil industry,42 the new natural resource 
concession was generally highly regulated domestically and 
supervised by the host State through a State company.  A typical 
product sharing agreement in the oil industry allocates the risk to 
the investor for the exploration and discovery of the mineral.  If 
successful, the host country and investor share ownership over the 
extracted mineral until the investor’s cost of exploration is fully 
recovered.43 
 
jurisprudence.  Dolzer and Schreuer assert that the investor’s legitimate 
expectations are based on the host State’s legal framework for investment at the 
time of investment plus any explicit assurances on which the investor relied.  
RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPHER SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 134 (2008). 
42 For examples of the many forms that contemporary petroleum concession 
agreements can take, see the website of the Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, http://www.ipaa.org.  See also R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 213–316 (2005). 
43 Although I emphasize petroleum concessions here as they historically have 
been an influential source of arbitral cases on concession agreements, accelerated 
investment in public service concessions such as water purification, 
telecommunications and electricity generation under BOT and BOO schemes took 
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The stabilization clause, an older contractual device countering 
State interference in concession agreements, was correspondingly 
revised for the new legal realities.  Termed by some commentators 
as a special variant of choice-of-law clause,44 stabilization clauses 
are employed by investors to prevent governments from changing 
the terms of a concession agreement by imposing various 
compensation conditions to any changes in the contract.  
Stabilization clauses in pre-war concessions45 simply attempted to 
prevent nationalization by forbidding the termination of the 
concession by administrative or legislative decree.  Once 
nationalization of natural resource industries was generally 
recognized as legal if undertaken for legitimate public purposes 
and subject to adequate compensation,46 investors began to 
incorporate stabilization clauses in investment agreements to 
allocate the financial risk of less drastic legislative changes 
lowering the value of the long-term investment.  In so doing, 
stabilization clauses began to encompass a progressively broader 
range of government conduct.  Contemporary stabilization clauses 
often seek to lock-in negotiated tax benefits and the off-take price 
in a public service or natural resource concession by forbidding 
changes in host country legislation that alter the conditions of the 
investment without the consent of the investor.47  They may range 
in scope from a “freezing clause,” requiring the applicable law to 
be the domestic law at the time of the conclusion of the contract to 
the exclusion of all subsequent regulation, to an economic 
 
place in the late 20th century, especially with the increase in privatization projects 
in the post-Soviet States.  DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 41, at 73. 
44 Id. at 75. 
45 See, for example, Article 17 of the 1948 Concession Agreement between 
Aminoil and the Shaikh of Kuwait as relayed in Martin Hunter & Anthony 
Sinclair, Aminoil Revisited: Reflections on a Story of Changing Circumstances, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION LEADING CASES FROM ICSID, 
NAFTA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 1, at 347. 
46 The arbitrator in the TOPCO arbitration found nationalization to be a 
violation of the concession’s stabilization clause.  Texaco v. Libya (TOPCO), 
Merits, 17 I.L.M. 1, 25–31 (Int’l Arb. Trib. 1978).  The arbitrators in BP Libya, 
Liamco-Libya, and Aminoil did not find that stabilization clauses could not render 
nationalization illegal.  See Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: 
Recent Developments in International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 301–04 (1982). 
47 Thomas W. Waelde & George N’di, Stabilising International Investment 
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 1 CENTRE FOR ENERGY 
PETROLEUM & MINERAL L. & POL’Y 9 (2000), available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk 
/cepmlp/journal/html/Vol1/article1-9.html. 
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equilibrium clause, which requires compensation in case of a 
change in expected profits from a project.48 
Today, such stabilization clauses potentially conflict directly 
with public contracting laws in many countries as well as national 
constitutions.  According to one view, however, even if 
stabilization clauses are invalid under domestic law, within 
investment agreements they are capable of binding the State under 
international law to specific investment obligations,49 particularly if 
a relevant investment treaty contains an umbrella clause, or the 
choice of law clause in an arbitration clause for the investment 
agreement specifies international law and the forum selection 
clause calls for international arbitration.  Some argue that the 
breach of a stabilization clause becomes an international 
wrongdoing as a breach of a sovereign commitment to refrain from 
exercising sovereign powers.50 
Throughout the twentieth century, the international settlement 
of concession disputes under dispute resolution clauses was 
formalized through an expansion of institutions and a growing 
acceptance of the theory of party autonomy in judicial systems 
requiring judicial acquiescence in forum selection clauses.  
International commercial arbitration continued to gain credibility 
and currency with the widespread ratification of the New York 
 
48 For a discussion of the implications of stabilization clauses for the exercise 
of social and environmental regulation, see Cotula, supra note 16. 
49 This was argued by the British government in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. 
Iran), 1952 I.C.J. Pleadings 64, 86–93 (July 22).  Sornarajah summarizes this theory 
as, “[t]he inclusion of the stabilization clause was seen as evidencing the intention 
of the State party not to subject it to its domestic law but to subject it to some 
external system which would ensure the validity of the stabilization clause and 
the contract which contains it.”  SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 408.  The current 
approach to the validity of stabilization clauses is to balance the limitations on 
sovereignty imposed by the clause with the reasonable expectations of the parties 
in light of all the relevant circumstances.  See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 554 (5th ed. 1998). 
50  Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R 117 (Int’l Arb. 
Trib. 1963); Sapphire Int. Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 53 I.L.R. 163 
(1963); TOPCO, 17 I.L.M. at 17.  See El Paso Energy International Company v. 
Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (Apr. 27, 2006); 
Pan Am. Energy LLC & B.P. Argentina Exploration Co. v. Argentina, Preliminary 
Objections (PAE), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13 (July 27, 2006), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PanAmericanBPJurisdiction-eng.pdf 
(highlighting the separation of general international law and treaty law).  For an 
overview of the holdings of major ad hoc petroleum arbitrations concerning 
stabilization clauses, see Margarita Coale, Stabilization Clauses in International 
Petroleum Transactions, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 217, 223–26 (2002). 
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Convention, making it much easier to enforce foreign and 
commercial arbitral awards than foreign judgments.51  The 
establishment of ICSID in 1965 was a watershed event that 
permitted parties in a dispute over a concession agreement to 
request ICSID arbitration by presenting an agreement to arbitrate 
at ICSID in writing.  The law relating to transnational State contract 
dispute resolution was developed through ad hoc petroleum 
arbitrations, the arbitrations of private tribunals of the ICC, public 
mixed claims tribunals,52 and in ICSID tribunals.53 
 
51 In the United States, the implementing legislation of the New York 
Convention under the Federal Arbitration Act is 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2006) (stating 
that proceedings shall be stayed when an issue therein has been referred to 
arbitration), 9 U.S.C. § 206 (stating that a court may force arbitration to be held), 
and 9 U.S.C. § 208 (stating that this chapter should not be applied in such a 
manner as to conflict with the Convention). 
52 Concerning oil concessions in the Iran-U.S. Claims tribunals, see Amoco 
Int’l Finance v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987) (holding that the 
shareholding interest in Kharg Chemical Company was lawfully expropriated by 
the Government of Iran and that the Government of Iran shall pay Amoco 
compensation for the expropriation); Mobil Oil Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 3 (1987) (holding that Iran is liable to Mobil for losses which Mobil could 
have expected to recover pursuant to successful negotiation of an agreement 
settling all the issues relating to the termination of the Sale and Purchase 
Agreement); Sedco Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248 
(1985) (holding that Sedco’s shareholder interest in Sediran Drilling Company 
was expropriated by Iran); Phillips Petroleum Inc. v. Iran (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib 1989), 
reprinted in International Decisions, 85 AM. J. INT’L. L. 184 (1991) (holding the 
Government of Iran liable for compensation for property taken during the Iranian 
Revolution).  The early history of state contracts in mixed claim tribunals in the 
Americas is documented in Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, State Breaches of 
Contracts with Aliens and International Law, 58 AM. J. INT’L. L. 881 (1964) (detailing 
when the breach by a state of a contract between an alien and the state constitutes 
a breach of international law). 
53 See Klockner v. Cameroon, Award, 2 ICSID (W. Bank) 9 (1994) (rejecting 
the requests that Cameroon make payment of the outstanding balance of a 
fertilizer factory and that Cameroon be compensated for losses it had incurred in 
the abandoned fertilizer project); S. Pac. Props. Ltd. v. Egypt, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, reprinted in 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 131 (1992) 
(granting jurisdiction to the Centre as there was no agreed upon dispute 
resolution mechanism); Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/1, reprinted in 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 377 (1988) (holding that the tribunal had 
jurisdiction over the parties); Vacuum Salt Prod. Ltd. v. Ghana, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/92/1, reprinted in 4 ICSID (W. Bank) 320 (1998) (dismissing the request for 
arbitration due to a lack of jurisdiction); Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Liberia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, Award of March 31, 1986 and Rectification of June 17, 
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Beginning in the 1990s, investment treaties with consent 
clauses came to play a more prominent role.  Following a sharp 
rise in the number of BITs with arbitration consent clauses, 
investors attempted to use direct recourse arbitration to 
unilaterally seize investment treaty tribunals for concession 
contract claims by invoking the umbrella clause and other general 
language in the subject matter jurisdiction clauses of investment 
protection treaties.  Usually they did so notwithstanding a forum 
selection clause in the contract calling for resolution in the courts of 
the host State.  Thus, a body of BIT arbitration cases addressing 
claims arising from concession contract disputes54  joined the 
earlier decisions relied on by arbitral tribunals to analyze 
transnational State contract issues.  But rather than deciding the 
disputes as transnational contract claims, as would occur in 
international commercial arbitration, investment treaty tribunals 
have instead almost uniformly accepted jurisdiction because of a 
breach in a relevant substantive treaty obligation between States.  
In particular, they have awarded relief to investors in concession 
contract disputes based on more diverse and subtle interpretations 
of the violations of the prohibition against uncompensated 
expropriation and the duty of fair and equitable treatment.55 
 
1986, 26 I.L.M. 647 (1987) (holding Liberia breached the contract and must pay 
damages). 
54 See Catriona Paterson, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in Infrastructure 
Projects (OECD, Working Papers on International Investment No. 2006/2, 2006) 
(studying twenty-eight arbitrations under BITs in telecommunications, 
transportation, water and sanitation and the energy sector). 
55 See Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Morocco, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6 
(Dec. 22, 2003); PSEG Global, Inc., v. Turkey, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5 
(Jan. 19, 2007) (holding that Turkey breached its Treaty obligation to accord the 
investor fair treatment and must pay damages); Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia 
(Aguas), Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (Oct. 21, 2005) 
(holding that there is not sufficient evidence to support an allegation of abuse of 
corporate form or fraud); Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Ecuador (Duke 
Energy), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19 (Aug. 18, 2008) (holding that 
Ecuador breached the Treaty and must pay damages); Azurix Corp. v. Argentina 
(Azurix), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (July 14, 2006) (holding that Azurix 
has shown that it has a prima facie case against Argentina for breaching the 
Treaty); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina (CMS Award), Award, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 12, 2005) (holding that Argentina breached the 
obligation in the Treaty to accord the investor fair and equitable treatment and 
must pay damages); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (CME), Award, 
UNCITRAL (Mar. 14, 2003) (holding that the Czech Republic breached the Treaty 
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After discussing the general principles of international law 
related to contract claims and investment treaty arbitration, below I 
present the reasoning of some of these BIT arbitrations on the 
treatment of contract claims in treaty tribunals.  The awards below 
are predominantly concerned with the threshold question of 
whether the investment treaty tribunal has jurisdiction for contract 
claims based on the scope of the consent to arbitrate in the relevant 
treaty. 
These cases are significant because they reflect the many 
dilemmas faced by public international law tribunals when 
considering contract claims, particularly the treatment of forum 
selection clauses.  More broadly, the rationales of these decisions 
on umbrella clauses frequently go to the heart of objections to the 
jurisdiction of treaty tribunals for contract claims. 
3. CONTRACT CLAIMS IN BIT TRIBUNALS 
3.1. General Principles 
3.1.1. Breach of a Contract with an Alien Investor and State 
Responsibility 
Under the customary international law on the treatment of 
aliens and their property, an ordinary breach of a contract with an 
alien will not give rise to State responsibility in the absence of some 
discriminatory or arbitrary conduct.56  Customary international 
law concerning State contracts with aliens evolved in the legal 
context of the system of diplomatic protection, in which the 
investor’s State alone asserted its interests vis-à-vis the host State of 
 
and must pay damages); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd v. Chile (MTD), Award, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/7 (May 25, 2004) (holding that Chile breached the Treaty and 
must pay damages); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador (Occidental), 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ICISD Case No. ARB/06/11 (Sept. 9, 2008) (holding that 
the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute involving the investment Treaty); 
Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (Metalclad), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 
(Aug. 30, 2000) (holding Metalclad was not treated fairly or equitably under 
NAFTA and that Mexico must pay damages); Técnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico (Tecmed), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 (May 
29, 2003) (holding that Mexico has breached the Treaty and must pay damages). 
56 See BROWNLIE, supra note 49, at 551 (noting that actions are discriminatory 
if directed against persons of a particular nationality or race; they are arbitrary 
when they lack a normal public purpose). 
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investment.57  Historically a breach of a contract with an alien alone 
was not seen by the United Kingdom and other major capital 
exporting countries as justifying diplomatic protection because of 
adverse political side effects.58  Other conditions must obtain in 
order for such a breach to qualify as a breach of an obligation to a 
State or individual under international law.59  Traditional opinion 
states that this holds true even if a contract contains a clause 
making international law applicable to the contract.  This follows 
from the doctrinal view denying the existence of a universal 
private law of contract, expressed by the PCIJ in the Serbian Loans 
case,60 as well as from the fact that one of the parties to the contract 
is not a proper subject of international law, and therefore the 
contract is not a treaty.61 
Specifically, customary international law provides redress for 
expropriation (direct or indirect) in the case that a government 
substantially impairs the value of an investment through unilateral 
interference with a contract by legislative or administrative means 
and the investor is not properly compensated. 62  Otherwise, 
customary international law would also provide a remedy if the 
State acted in so arbitrary a manner as to commit a “denial of 
justice.” 63  In sum, if a host State incidentally breaches a contract 
 
57 See Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30) (stating that by taking up the case of one of 
its subjects and resorting to diplomatic action on his behalf, a state is in reality 
asserting its own rights). 
58 See R.Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 
156, 157–60 (1961) (detailing the historical attitudes of countries towards 
intervention in contract claims). 
59 For a thorough analysis of the circumstances when the breach of a contract 
with an alien could simultaneously be a breach of the law of State Responsibility, 
see Amerasinghe, supra note 52. 
60 See Serbian Loans Case, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) at 31 (July 12) (“Any contract 
which is not a contract between States in their capacity as subjects of international 
law is based on municipal law of some country.”). 
61 See Derek W. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: the Twilight 
Zone of International Law, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 929, 936 (1986) (“[T]he relevance of 
international law is theoretically undeniable in such a case, but its practical 
relevance is limited by the fact that international law contains no rules relevant to 
a breach of contract as such.”). 
62 See BROWNLIE, supra note 49, at 553. 
63 See JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987) 
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with an investor while exercising its police powers in a non-
discriminatory way without depriving the investor of the use or 
value of the asset in whole or significant part and provides the 
investor with an opportunity to contest the claim either in its own 
court system with fair procedural protections or in another forum, 
the host State has not committed an international wrong. 
3.1.2. The Jurisdiction of BIT Tribunals 
States have further defined responsibility and remedies in 
respect of the activities of one State’s investors in the territory of 
the other through BITs and the investment chapters of Free Trade 
Agreements.  Under this special system, comprised of both public 
international law and private law elements, rights arising from the 
breach of a BIT’s standards for treatment toward the investor or 
investments vest directly with the investor and not with the 
investor’s State.64  The State of the investor has no residual interest 
in the requested remedy, which is awarded entirely to the affected 
investor.  The award generally has no binding effect except with 
respect to the individual cases and parties; awards are considered 
commercial arbitral awards for purposes of enforcement.  This sub-
system of international law,65 created by BITs, is not confined to the 
customary international law on State responsibility in relation to a 
breach of contract.66 
 
A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from. . . 
(2) a repudiation or breach by the state of a contract with a national of 
another state (a) where the repudiation or breach is (i) discriminatory; or 
(ii) motivated by non-commercial considerations and compensatory 
damages are not paid; or (b) where the foreign national is not given an 
adequate forum to determine his claim of breach or is not compensated 
for any breach determined to have occurred. 
Id. 
64 See Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 185–89 (2003) (noting that investment treaties 
confer an independent legal interest in investors). 
65 See id. at 159 (explaining the “hybrid or sui generis nature of the legal 
relationship between the investor and the host State that arises out of the 
investment regime.”). 
66  See James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, The 22nd 
Freshfields Lecture on International Arbitration 3 (Nov. 29, 2007), available at 
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/Freshfields%20Lecture%202007 
.pdf. 
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The dispute resolution clauses of BITs confer standing on a 
national of a Party State who makes a covered investment in the 
territory of another Party State concerning an irreconcilable 
“investment dispute.”  When a dispute falls under the subject 
matter jurisdiction clause of an investment treaty dispute 
resolution section and any procedural conditions agreed to by the 
States have been satisfied, the investment treaty expresses an offer 
of consent on the part of the State party to engage in arbitration 
with the investor at the investor’s election.  In determining whether 
a dispute is within the scope of the treaty parties’ consent to 
arbitrate, BIT Tribunals are indisputably bound by the law of the 
interpretation of treaties, especially Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“The Vienna 
Convention”).67  However, it is often contended that the consent 
under a BIT is more than merely an element of a treaty: James 
Crawford, for instance, has characterized the consent clause as 
contract, rather than a treaty, governed by international law that 
springs into effect when the investor perfects the consent by 
requesting arbitration.68 
3.1.3. Disputes with Public Entities over than the National 
Government 
Many of the cases dealing with contract issues that have come 
before investment treaty tribunals originated as disputes over 
contracts concluded with a local government, an independent 
governmental authority closely associated with a national 
government or under its authority, or a government-invested 
entity.  In these cases, investors have invoked the customary 
international law rule of attribution to maintain the claim against 
the host State in the treaty tribunals.  If an entity is recognized as 
“an organ of the central government” by the law of the country, or 
if it is “empowered by the law of the State to exercise elements of 
governmental authority,” and it is acting in that capacity, acts of 
 
67 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 8 
I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of its object and purpose.”).  This treaty approach to 
interpretation of the consent to arbitrate reflects the reasoning of the majority of 
Tribunals.  But see id. art. 32 (discussing supplementary means of interpretation). 
68 See Crawford, supra note 66, at 10–11 (describing a BIT as a treaty 
containing an offer to arbitrate). 
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that entity will be attributed to the State for purposes of 
determining State responsibility.69  Thus, normally, the fact that the 
counterparty to the contract in dispute is with a local government 
or a government-owned company would not by itself 
automatically bar a treaty claim against a national government, 
despite the fact that it bars the contract claim against the national 
government.70 
3.2. Investment Treaty Arbitral Jurisprudence on Contract Claims 
3.2.1. Treaty Claims Versus Contract Claims: Vivendi 
The most influential case to date setting out the principal issues 
in the treatment of contract claims in BIT tribunals is the Vivendi 
Annulment.71  In sharp contrast to the oil arbitrations of the earlier 
era that considered international law and domestic law flexibly in 
matters of contract, the Ad Hoc Committee in the Vivendi 
Annulment pointedly distinguished treaty and contract claims 
according to the source of rights invoked and insisted on their 
resolution according to their respective sources of law. 
The original Vivendi dispute centered on a thirty-year 
Concession Contract for water treatment between a French 
Company CGE (later purchased by Vivendi), and the Argentine 
 
69 See Report of the International Law Commissionto the General Assemply, Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 4, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L 21 (declaring that “the 
conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law”); see also id. art. 5 (explaining that persons or entities that do not 
fall under the purview of Article 4 may still be considered State actors so long as 
they exercise certain elements of the governmental authority).  But see id. art. 5, 
cmt. 3 (noting that absent any stipulations in a treaty, the mere fact that an entity 
was established or funded by a State is not enough for its actions to be attributable 
to a State). 
70 In order to make a contract claim in an ICSID dispute against a State sub-
entity, in addition to satisfying the subject matter jurisdiction of the treaty, the 
contract claims must involve a State sub-entity that was stipulated in advance.  See 
ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 25(3) (“Consent by a constituent subdivision 
or agency of a Contracting State shall require the approval of that State unless that 
State notifies the Centre that no such approval is required.”). 
71 See Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina (Vivendi 
Annulment), Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (July 3, 2002), 
reprinted in 19 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 89 (2004) (coming to separate 
conclusions with respect to treaty and contract claims according to their 
individual sources of law). 
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Province of Tucumán.72  The application for arbitration by CGE 
claimed that certain acts and omissions of Argentina, including 
those actions by the provincial authorities that should be attributed 
to Argentina under international law, violated the expropriation 
clauses and fair and equitable treatment guarantees of the France 
Argentine BIT.73  The dispute resolution provisions of the BIT itself 
expressly gave the investor the choice to bring a claim in domestic 
courts or in international arbitration.  The Concession Contract’s 
forum selection clause, Article 16.4, provided for the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the contentious administrative courts of Tucumán. 
Argentina objected to jurisdiction of the BIT Tribunal on the 
grounds inter alia that the only dispute presented by the Claimants 
related exclusively to the Concession Contract, to which it, itself, 
was not a party.  It also argued the dispute resolution provision of 
the Concession Agreement required the dispute to be submitted to 
the courts of Argentina.74. 
The original Vivendi Tribunal decided to separate the 
allegations of the claimant into claims against the national 
authorities (the federal claims) and the provincial authorities (the 
Tucumán claims).  With respect to the federal claims, the Tribunal 
found that Argentina had not breached the treaty since the specific 
allegations made by the Claimants concerned the acts of Tucumán, 
and Argentina was under no duty to prevent or enjoin the actions 
of Tucumán under the treaty.  With respect to the local claims, the 
Tribunal stated that the facts of the case made it impossible for it to 
distinguish or separate violations of the BIT from breaches of the 
Concession Contract without interpreting the Contract.  Therefore, 
it agreed with the Argentina’s objection that because the 
allegations relating to the actions of the Tucumán authorities had 
been assigned by the forum selection clause of the Concession 
Contract to the administrative courts of Tucumán, the claimants 
 
72 See Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Compagnie Générale des 
Eaux v. Argentina (Vivendi I), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, paras. 56–61 
(Nov. 21, 2000), reprinted in 16 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 641 (2001) 
(detailing the positions taken by each party to the arbitration). 
73 See Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
Arg.-Fr., art. 5, July 3, 1991, 1728 U.N.T.S. 298, 300 (providing for the protection of 
the investments made by each contracting party against expropriation and calling 
for favorable treatment should losses be suffered under certain circumstances). 
74 See Vivendi I, paras. 40–55 (discussing whether or not the BIT Tribunal had 
jurisdiction over the dispute). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
960 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
had a duty to first pursue their rights with respect to such claims in 
the contractually agreed-upon forum.75 
In this case, however, the obligation to resort to the local 
courts is compelled by the express terms of Article 16.4 of 
the [Concession Contract] and the impossibility, on the 
facts of the instant case, of separating potential breaches of 
contract claims from BIT violations without interpreting 
and applying the Concession Contract, a task that the 
contract assigns expressly to the local courts.76 
In its 2002 Decision on Annulment, although the Annulment 
Committee found no fault with the Vivendi Tribunal’s 
determination of the federal claims, it held that the Tribunal had 
manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to consider the local 
claims on the merits, because these claims alleged breaches of the 
treaty the Tribunal had held to be in its competence.77  
Emphasizing the two autonomous systems of municipal and 
international law, the Committee found that the Tribunal had 
mistakenly referred the international claims to the local courts 
solely on the basis of municipal law considerations. In so doing, 
the Committee denied that a forum selection clause agreed to by 
the parties could preclude the jurisdiction of a treaty Tribunal 
when a breach of the treaty was claimed. 
A State may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and 
vice versa, and this is certainly true of these provisions of the BIT. 
[W]hether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether 
there has been a breach of contract are different questions.  
Each of these claims will be determined by reference to its 
own proper or applicable law—in the case of the BIT, by 
international law; in the case of the Concession Contract, by 
the proper law of the contract, in other words, the law of 
Tucumán. . . .78 
 
75 Id. para. 81 (declaring that Article 16.4 provides clear remedies to the 
Claimant and that any decision that requires an application of the Concession 
Contract must be sought in the courts of Tucumán). 
76 Id. 
77 See Vivendi Annulment, paras. 111–12 (noting that the Tribunal could have 
ruled on the facts concerning breaches of the BIT and yet failed to do so). 
78 Id. para. 96. 
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In the Committee’s view, it is not open to an ICSID tribunal 
having jurisdiction under a BIT in respect of a claim based 
upon a substantive provision of that BIT, to dismiss the 
claim on the ground that it could or should have been dealt 
with by a national court.  In such a case, the inquiry which 
the ICSID tribunal is require to undertake is one governed 
by the ICSID Convention, by the BIT and by applicable 
international law.  Such an inquiry is neither in principle 
determined, nor precluded, by any issue of municipal law, 
including any municipal law agreement of the parties.79 
A state cannot rely on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a 
contract to avoid the characterisation of its conduct as 
internationally unlawful under a treaty.80 
Referring to the Woodruff Case,81 the Committee reiterated the 
view that the legal effect of a forum selection clause should depend 
on the whether the fundamental nature of the dispute was 
contractual or treaty-based.  “[W]here the essential basis of a claim 
brought before an international tribunal is a breach of contract, the 
tribunal will give effect to any valid choice of forum clause in the 
contract.”82 
On the other hand, where “the fundamental basis of the 
claim” is a treaty laying down an independent standard by 
which the conduct of the parties is to be judged, the 
existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract 
between the claimant and the respondent state or one of its 
subdivisions cannot operate as a bar to the application of 
the treaty standard.83 
After the Vivendi Annulment, BIT Tribunals began to face 
squarely the issue of jurisdiction over independent contractual 
claims on a more frequent basis. Prospective contract claimants 
attempted to advance breach of contract claims that were not 
 
79 Id. para. 102. 
80 Id. paras. 102–03. 
81 Woodruff Case (U.S. v. Venez.), 9 R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 213 (U.S.-Venez. 
Cl. Comm’n) 1903. 
82 Vivendi Annulment, para. 98. 
83 Id. para. 101. 
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simultaneously treaty breaches by contending: 1) an umbrella 
clause operating to convert a breach of contract claim into a treaty 
claim vests the Tribunal with jurisdiction for the contract claim or, 
2) a generally-worded dispute resolution clause referring to 
“investment disputes” should be interpreted to include contract 
claims.84  A few cases have considered the question of whether a 
Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) clause can entitle an investor to 
bring his or her contract claim to investment arbitration, because 
the host State offers such a benefit to another country’s investors. 
In practice, only a few tribunals have held in favor of independent 
contract claims jurisdiction,85 and to the extent that investment 
treaty tribunals have considered jurisdiction for disputes arising 
out of contract claims, they have imposed various qualifications.  
The overwhelming majority of cases have held that BIT Tribunals 
will not have jurisdiction over a contract claim between a State and 
an alien unless the government’s conduct at the time of the 
contractual breach also breached a substantive obligation under 
the treaty.86 
 
84 See Emmanuel Gaillard, Treaty-Based Jurisdiction: Broad Dispute Resolution 
Clauses, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 6, 2005, at 3 (noting that the Vivendi decision broadened the 
field of potential investment claims under BITs); see also John P. Gaffney & James 
L. Loftis, The ‘Effective Ordinary Meaning’ of BITs and the Jurisdiction of Treaty-Based 
Tribunals to Hear Contract Claims, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 5, 47–67 (2007) 
(summarizing recent case law on umbrella clauses and broad dispute resolution 
clauses). 
85 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines (SGS 
Philippines), Objections to Jurisdiction. ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, para. 157 (Jan. 
29, 2004), reprinted in 8 ICSID (W. Bank) 518 (2005) (“[I]t is not enough for the 
claimant to assert the existence of a dispute as to fair treatment or expropriation”); 
see also Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion, para. 262 
(Aug. 19, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Eureko                                
-PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, para. 136 (Oct. 12, 2005), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf (“A breach of the [Share Purchase 
Agreement] is, as a matter of law, capable of constituting a breach, attributable to 
the Respondent, of the BIT . . . .).  But see Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, Award, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/96/3 (Mar. 9, 1998), reprinted in 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 200 (2002) 
(finding that Venezuela must repay the principle on promissory notes owed to 
Fedax on the basis of the obligations clause of the U.S.-Venezuela BIT). 
86 See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina (Sempra on Jurisdiction), 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (May 11, 2005) (ruling that 
the ICSID only offers narrow jurisdiction and that parties must meet its 
requirements); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina (Sempra Award), Award, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/16 (Sept. 28, 2007) (separating license claims from the acclaim 
that Argentina violated the umbrella clause of the treaty at issue), Pan Am. 
Energy LLC v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections (PAE), ICSID Case No. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/5
2010] INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS 963 
 
3.2.2. Jurisdiction for Independent Contractual Claims under 
Umbrella Clauses 
At least twenty cases in treaty arbitration have dealt with the issue 
of whether an umbrella clause internationalizes a State contract 
claim.  The first of these, SGS Pakistan, sets out a restrictive 
interpretation of umbrella clauses, condemning the interpretation 
that they confer contract claims jurisdiction on a treaty tribunal 
except in extraordinary circumstances. 
3.2.2.1. The Restrictive View: SGS Pakistan 
In 1994 the Claimant SGS entered into an agreement to provide 
pre-shipment inspection services for imports to Pakistan and 
estimates of customs revenues generated by the source country 
(the “PSI Agreement”).  Although it prescribed a five-year contract 
period, the PSI Agreement allowed the parties to terminate at any 
time after the first year as long as three months notice was given.  
Its dispute resolution clause (Article 11.1) called for resolution in 
accordance with the Pakistan Arbitration Act with the seat of 
arbitration in Pakistan.87 
The PSI entered into force on January 1, 1995, and the Pakistani 
government gave notice of termination in January 1997.  During 
 
ARB/03/13, (July 27, 2006) (highlighting the separation of general international 
law and treaty law), Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan (Impregilo), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3 (Apr. 22, 2005) (discussing jurisdiction 
over a breach of Italy–Pakistan BIT); IBM World Trade Corp. v. Ecuador, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/10 (Dec. 22, 2003), reprinted in 13 ICSID 
(W. Bank) 102 (2008) (ruling that the breach of the BIT was a separate issue legally 
and jurisdictionally than a breach of a concession contract); AES Corp. v. 
Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, para. 94 (Apr. 
26, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AES-Argentina                          
-Jurisdiction_001.pdf (stating that the ICSID Tribunal “has no jurisdiction over 
any breach of the concession contracts binding upon the companies controlled by 
AES and the Argentine public authorities under administrative Argentine law, 
unless such breach would at the same time result in a violation by the host State of 
its obligations towards the U.S. private investors under the BIT”); Joy Mining 
Mach., Ltd. v. Egypt (Joy Mining), Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/11, para. 30 (Aug. 6, 2004), reprinted in 13 ICSID (W. Bank) 121 (2008) 
(calling for a careful review of all claims when “the parties have such divergent 
views about the meaning of the dispute in light of the Contract and the Treaty.”). 
87 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan (SGS Pakistan), Decision 
of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, paras. 
11–15 (Aug. 6, 2003), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet 
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC657_En&caseId=C6 
(describing the history and the terms of the agreement between SGS and 
Pakistan). 
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the intervening period services were performed and invoices were 
paid partially by Pakistan.  SGS filed a commercial claim in Swiss 
courts for “wrongful termination of contract” that was dismissed 
for reasons of sovereign immunity.  In September 2000, Pakistan 
invoked Article 11.1 of the PSI Agreement by asking the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan to refer the decision to an arbitrator in 
accordance with the Pakistan Arbitration Act, to which SGS 
responded with counterclaims of “wrongful repudiation of 
contract.”88 
While these claims were pending, SGS initiated ICSID 
arbitration against the government of Pakistan for violation of five 
articles of the Swiss Pakistani BIT, 89 including: failure to promote 
SGS’s investment (Article 3(1)), failure to protect SGS’s investment 
(Article 4(1)), failure to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of 
SGS’s investment (Article 4(2)), and expropriation without 
compensation (Article 6(1)).90  SGS simultaneously asked the 
Tribunal to find liability for breach of the PSI contract under an 
“observance of commitments” clause, Article 11. SGS then 
unsuccessfully made several attempts to stay the Pakistan 
arbitration through local courts pending the outcome of ICSID 
arbitration.  Eventually the ICSID Tribunal recommended a stay of 
the Pakistan arbitration until it had made a determination on its 
jurisdiction, to which the Pakistani arbitrator agreed. 
As recalled in the Decision on Jurisdiction of August 2003, 
Pakistan’s central argument was that jurisdiction should be denied 
because the claims were entirely contractual in nature,91 the treaty 
claims comprising merely a relabeling of the previously submitted 
contract claim. Citing the Vivendi Annulment, Pakistan argued 
because the PSI agreement contained a valid forum selection clause 
for the contract, it should be respected by the Tribunal.  The 
jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal is “limited to the adjudication of 
disputes that the parties have actually agreed to submit to the 
 
88 Id. paras. 16, 20–29. 
89 Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Switz.-Pak., July 11, 1995, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/as/1998/2601 
.pdf [hereinafter Swiss Pakistan BIT]. 
90 SGS Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13.  The complaint set out 8 heads 
of compensation, including payment of outstanding invoices of U.S. $8,368,430.49, 
compensation for lost profits of U.S. $31,500,000 and compensation for “lost 
opportunities” of U.S. $70,000,000 which were substantially the same as those in 
the Pakistan arbitration. 
91 Id. paras. 43–44. 
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Centre and not to an alternative forum” under the principles of 
pacta sunt servanda and party autonomy.92  In the alternative, if BIT 
claims existed that were not identical to the contract claims, the PSI 
arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass them, therefore 
all claims should be submitted to the Pakistani arbitration.93 
3.2.2.1.1. Holding on Contract Claims 
Addressing the issue of whether it could adjudicate solely 
contract claims, the Tribunal’s decision began with an analysis of 
the validity and priority of the PSI Agreement arbitration clause.  
“Article 11.1 of the PSI Agreement is a valid forum selection clause 
so far as concerns the Claimant’s contract claims which do not also 
amount to BIT claims, and it is a clause that this Tribunal should 
respect.”94  It further denied that the wide dispute resolution clause 
of the BIT, Article 9, referring to “disputes with respect to 
investments” included contract claims.  “That phrase, however, 
while descriptive of the factual subject matter of the disputes, does 
not relate to the legal basis of the claims, or the cause of action 
asserted in the claims.”95 
Accordingly, the Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction with 
respect to claims based on alleged breaches of the PSI Agreement 
that did not also constitute or amount to breaches of the 
substantive standards of the BIT.96 
3.2.2.1.2. Holding on the umbrella clause 
Article 11 of the Swiss Pakistan BIT reads: “Either Contracting 
Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the 
commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of 
the investors of the other Contracting Party.”97 
In its textual analysis the Tribunal could not find specific intent 
by the treaty Parties to “elevate” contract breaches to treaty claims. 
Considering the widely accepted principle with which we 
started, namely, that under general international law, a 
 
92 Id. paras. 48–50. 
93 Id. para. 70. 
94 Id. para. 161 (emphasis in original). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. para. 162. 
97 Id. para. 163 (quoting Swiss Pakistan BIT). 
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violation of a contract entered into by a State with an 
investor of another State, is not, by itself, a violation of 
international law, and considering further that the legal 
consequences that the Claimant would have us attribute to 
Article 11 of the BIT are so far-reaching in scope, and so 
automatic and unqualified and sweeping in their operation, 
so burdensome in their potential impact upon a 
Contracting Party, we believe that clear and convincing 
evidence must be adduced by the Claimant [of shared 
intent of such interpretation]. . . .  We do not find such 
evidence in the text itself of Article 11.98 
Specifically, among other consequences, if Article 11 
internationalized every contract claim, “there would be no real 
need to demonstrate a violation of those substantive treaty 
standards if a simple breach of contract, or of municipal statute or 
regulation, by itself, would suffice to constitute a treaty 
violation. . . .”99 
The Tribunal considered that the umbrella clause could be 
nothing more than “an implied affirmative commitment to enact 
implementing rules and regulations necessary or appropriate to 
give effect to a contractual or statutory undertaking in favor of 
investors of another Contracting Party that would otherwise be a 
dead letter.”100  The Tribunal could not find that 
Article 11 of the BIT had the effect of entitling a Contracting 
Party’s investor, like SGS, in the face of a valid forum 
selection contract clause, to ‘elevate’ its contract claims with 
another Contracting Party, like the PSI Agreement, to 
claims grounded in a BIT, and accordingly to bring such 
contract claims to this Tribunal for resolution and 
decision.101 
3.2.2.2. The Expansive View: SGS Philippines 
Six months after the SGS Pakistan proceeding, a Tribunal 
adjudicated a dispute over a similar type of contract by an 
 
98 Id. para. 167. 
99 Id. para. 168. 
100 Id. para. 172. 
101 Id. para. 165. 
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affiliated company under the Swiss-Philippines BIT.102  Based on a 
differently-worded clause, its reasoning came to the exactly 
opposite conclusion on jurisdiction over purely contractual claims 
and the legal effect of umbrella clauses.  However, its initial 
holding led to a similar outcome by deferring to local courts for a 
consideration of the amount due under the contract claim. 
In 1991 the Republic of Philippines entered into a contract with 
SGS for Comprehensive Import Supervision Service (“CISS”) to 
verify the quality, quantity and price of imported goods prior to 
shipment to the Philippines for an initial period of three years.  
Article 12 of the CISS Agreement read: “The provisions of this 
Agreement shall be governed in all respects by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.  All actions 
concerning disputes in connection with the obligations of either 
party to this Agreement shall be filed at the Regional Trial Courts 
of Makati or Manila.”103  The contract was extended twice with 
amended services but was not renewed after the second extension 
concluded in 2000.  During the contract period, enormous volumes 
of commerce were inspected and invoiced at U.S. $680 million but 
a government inquiry found that only about U.S. $540 million was 
paid. 
SGS commenced ICSID arbitration based on breaches of clauses 
of the Swiss-Philippines BIT guaranteeing full protection and 
security (Article IV(1)); fair and equitable treatment (Article IV (2)); 
effective and adequate compensation in cases of expropriation 
(Article VI(1)); and observation of obligations (Article X (2)) (the 
umbrella clause).104 
Among its objections to jurisdiction, the Philippines argued 
that as the dispute’s essential basis was contractual, the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction was precluded by a previous dispute resolution 
agreement in the CISS Agreement.105  “Article 12 represents a real 
and genuine agreement, being the product of an arms-length 
bargain of the parties which . . . resulted from a competitive tender 
and bidding process.”106  It further maintained that the Swiss-
 
102 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, Decision  
Jurisdiction (SGS Philippines), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, para. 157 (Jan. 29, 
2004), reprinted in 8 ICSID (W. Bank) 518 (2005). 
103 Id. para. 22. 
104 Id. para. 44. 
105 Id. para. 51. 
106 Id. para. 52. 
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Philippines BIT had no application to purely contractual disputes 
and denied the BIT was intended to override previous obligations 
with respect to “specific investments.”107 
With respect to the umbrella clause, the Philippines response in 
part echoed the SGS Pakistan Tribunal’s reasoning: 
SGS’s interpretation of Article X(2) effectively 
emasculates the substantive protection contained in Arts. 
III–VI.  What SGS is effectively saying is that this 
substantial body of international law practice is now to 
be rendered effectively otiose because the Claimant need 
no longer prove the additional element, it need only 
argue that a breach of a private, commercial contract has 
been violated by a State and yet still be able to pursue its 
grievances in an international forum.108 
3.2.2.2.1 Holding on the Umbrella Clause 
The umbrella clause of the Swiss-Philippines BIT States: “Each 
Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has assumed with 
regard to specific investments in its territory by investors of the 
other Contracting Party.”109  The Tribunal found that an analysis of 
the clause’s mandatory wording, its order in the treaty text in the 
substantive section, and the declared object and purpose of the 
treaty supported the Claimant’s interpretation.110  But the Tribunal 
stressed that the umbrella clause did not convert questions of 
contract law into questions of treaty law, nor did it change the 
proper law of the CISS Agreement from the law of the Philippines 
to international law.  Under Article X(2) the Philippines was 
internationally responsible for the performance of the obligations 
under the contract only once the terms had been ascertained under 
the terms of the contract.111 
The basic obligation on the State in this case is to pay what 
is due under the contract, which is an obligation that is 
assumed with regard to the specific investment (the 
performance of services under the CISS Agreement).  But 
this obligation does not mean that the determination of 
 
107 Id. para. 51(e). 
108 Id. para. 76. 
109 Id. para. 115. 
110 Id. paras. 115–16. 
111 Id. para. 126. 
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how much money the Philippines is obliged to pay 
becomes a treaty matter.  The extent of the obligation is still 
governed by the contract, and it can only be determined by 
reference to the terms of the contract.112 
3.2.2.2.2. Holding on Contract Claims 
The tribunal held that the dispute resolution clause of the 
treaty referring to “disputes with respect to investments between a 
Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting 
Party”113 was intended to include contract claims because among 
the fora, only the treaty Tribunal was competent to consider both 
treaty and contract claims.  Therefore, efficiency counseled treating 
the claims in a single forum.114  But the Tribunal made clear that 
the BIT could not override the effective and exclusive dispute 
resolution clause in the CISS agreement, nor did the BIT “give SGS 
an alternative route for the resolution of contractual claims which 
it was bound to submit to the Philippine courts under that 
Agreement.”115  Instead, the Tribunal decided that the significance 
of the exclusive forum selection clause went to the question of 
admissibility: 
Thus the question is not whether the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction: unless otherwise expressly provided, treaty 
jurisdiction is not abrogated by contract.  The question is 
whether a party should be allowed to rely on a contract as 
the basis of its claim when the contract itself refers that 
claim exclusively to another forum.  In the Tribunal’s view 
the answer is that it should not be allowed to do so, unless 
there are good reasons, such as force majeure, preventing the 
claimant from complying with its contract.  This 
impediment, based as it is on the principle that a party to a 
contract cannot claim on that contract without itself 
complying with it, is more naturally considered as a matter 
of admissibility than jurisdiction. . . . SGS should not be 
 
112 Id. para. 127. 
113 Id. para. 34. 
114 Id. para. 132. 
115 Id. para. 143. 
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able to approbate and reprobate in respect of the same 
contract . . . .116 
Moreover, as the only issue effectively left to be decided was 
the amount of the claim, the Tribunal held that until the question 
of the scope of the Respondent’s obligation to pay is clarified, 
either by agreement or submission to the Philippine court, that its 
decision would be premature and ordered a stay for both types of 
claims.117 
3.2.2.2.3. SGS Philippines Revisited 
With no resolution forthcoming after three-and-a-half years, 
the Tribunal in September 2007 informed the Parties that the stay 
would be lifted in order to allow them to hold a hearing to present 
their views on the State of the dispute and to decide whether the 
conditions of admissibility still obtain.118  At the hearing the 
Tribunal ascertained that the amount due on the invoice had been 
satisfactorily determined by government accounting.  It then 
considered two additional issues.  First, the Claimant had 
abandoned the request for contractual interest for the amount of 
interest due on the unpaid invoice and instead requested the more 
favorable compounded interest rate under international law.  
Secondly, the Claimant alleged that due to fraudulent reporting of 
export clearances in China, an additional U.S. $113 million in losses 
had been sustained. 
As to the interest, the Tribunal decided: 
Its claim to international law interest for non-payment of 
the amount due under Article X(2) of the BIT is predicated 
on the finding of a breach of that article, and as explained 
above, the conditions for the award of interest under 
international law (which are in the discretion of the 
Tribunal) have so far not been met.119 
Concerning the “Chinese fraud” allegation, it stated: 
 
116 Id. paras. 154–55. 
117 Id. para. 175. 
118 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, Order of the 
Tribunal on Further Proceedings, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, paras. 25, 27 (Dec. 
17, 2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SGSvPhil-order.pdf. 
119 Id. para. 24. 
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. . . it cannot be said that there is in any forum a distinct 
dispute between the parties as to sums due by one to the 
other arising from the allegation.  In these circumstances it 
is difficult to see how it could of itself preclude the 
admissibility of SGS’s claim to payment under the BIT.120 
Accordingly, because the Tribunal concluded that the 
conditions for inadmissibility no longer obtained, it ordered the 
parties to continue the treaty arbitration.121 
The SGS Pakistan restrictive view of the legal effect of umbrella 
clauses has been endorsed by such tribunals as those in Salini v. 
Jordan,122 Joy Mining, Impregilio, El Paso,123 and PAE.124  The 
tribunals in Noble Ventures, Eureko Mining, MTD equity, LG & E, 
Siemens, Duke Energy, and Sempra125 took a more expansive view in 
line with SGS Philippines.  Among these, only the tribunals in Noble 
Ventures126 and Eureko Mining127 accepted that a breach of a 
contractual obligation was identical to a treaty breach.  Many have 
required a legislative or executive commitment in addition to those 
made in the contract itself to trigger the operation of the umbrella 
clause,128 and some have applied the umbrella clause only to the 
breach of the legislative commitment itself and not to a specific 
 
120 Id. para. 25. 
121 Id. para. 28. 
122 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Jordan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/13, paras. 120–30 (Nov. 9, 2004). 
123 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/15, paras. 84–88 (Apr. 27, 2006), reprinted in 21 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT L.J. 488 (2006). 
124 Pan Am. Energy LLC v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections 
(PAE), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, paras. 94–116 (July 27, 2006), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PanAmericanBPJurisdiction-eng.pdf. 
125 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, Award (Sempra Award), ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/16, paras. 310–14 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org 
/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC69
4_En&caseId=C8. 
126  Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 
para. 136 (Oct. 12, 2005) available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf. 
127  Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion, para. 262 
(Aug. 19, 2005), reprinted in 12 ICSID (W. Bank) 335 (2005). 
128 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/19, para. 322 (Aug. 18, 2008), available at http://www.arbitration.fr 
/resources/ICSID-ARB-04-19.pdf. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
972 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
commitment in a contract.129  One tribunal held that an umbrella 
clause breach occurred by a violation of a power purchase 
agreement because of assurances provided by the existing 
statutory framework for energy regulation.130 
3.2.2.2.4. The Test of Pussiance Publique: Impreglio 
A few tribunals have justified the limitation on contract claims 
jurisdiction by reference to “the test of puissance publique.”  
Under this principle, only government conduct in a sovereign 
capacity can trigger the treaty’s protection through the umbrella 
clause, not a mere contractual breach. The Impreglio Tribunal, in 
considering whether the umbrella clause internationalized a 
contract for construction of a barrage and water channel, expressed 
this view: 
Only the State in the exercise of its sovereign authority 
(puissance publique) and not as a contracting party, may 
breach the obligations assumed under the BIT.  In other 
words, the investment protection treaty only provides a 
remedy to the investor where the investor proves that the 
alleged damages were a consequence of the Host State 
acting in breach of the obligations it had assumed under the 
treaty. 131 
3.2.2.2.5. Joy Mining: Denying Protection for 
Commercial Claims 
Several tribunals have criticized the adjudication of contract 
claims in treaty tribunals on the grounds that to allow it would be 
“destructive” of the two legal orders, municipal and international.  
The Joy Mining Tribunal considered a dispute arising out of a 
 
129  Sempra Award, paras. 305–22 (Sept. 28, 2007). 
130 LG&E v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
para. 175 (Oct. 3, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents 
/ARB021_LGE-Decision-on-Liability-en.pdf. 
131  Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction (Impreglio), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/3, para. 260 (Apr. 22, 2005), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/impregilo-decision.pdf.  The “puissance 
publique” test to determine whether a contractual breach may be asserted as a 
breach of the BIT is discussed in Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. 
Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, para. 180 (Nov. 
14, 2005), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request 
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC523_En&caseId=C27#17. 
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supply contract for longwall mining systems in a phosphate mine 
(“the Contract”) between Joy Mining Machinery Limited and the 
General Organization for Industrial and Mining Projects of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt (“IMC”).132  The Contract and a later 
Amendment Agreement required letters of guarantee for contract 
performance and a timetable for release of these guarantees 
connected to the performance and the achievement of certain levels 
of phosphate production.  The guarantee amounted to UK£ 9, 
605,228, about two-thirds of the total Contract price.133 The 
Contract contained an arbitration clause requiring “all matters in 
dispute” to be settled under the rules of UNCITRAL through the 
regional center for arbitration in Cairo after obtaining the consent 
of the Ministry of Industry, or, through the Egyptian courts.134  
Disagreements arose and persisted as to the causes of performance 
problems. In the end, IMC paid the full purchase price of the 
equipment according to the Contract but declined to release the 
guarantees. 
In bringing the dispute to ICSID, Joy Mining asserted that the 
Contract was an investment under the United Kingdom-Arab 
Republic of Egypt Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (“the Treaty”) and that the failure to release the 
guarantees was a violation of several provisions of the Treaty.135  In 
particular it claimed that the equipment obtained by the letters of 
guarantee had been expropriated, that free transfer of funds had 
been prevented and that Egypt had failed to accord fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security to its 
investment.136  In addition, Joy Mining asserted that by virtue of 
Article 2(2) of the Treaty, the umbrella clause, all violations of the 
Contract were violations of the Treaty.137 
The tribunal did not accept the characterization of the Contract 
or the guarantees as investments for the purposes of the treaty.  
Instead it considered the contractual arrangements for the 
guarantees a “contingent liability.”138  Neither did it think it would 
 
132  Joy Mining Machinery, Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Award on 
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, para. 15 (Aug. 6, 2004). 
133 Id. para. 17. 
134 Id. para. 92. 
135 Id. para. 22. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. para. 68. 
138 Id. para. 44. 
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be possible to expropriate “a contingent liability.”139  Thus, it found 
the entire dispute to be an ordinary commercial dispute.  In the 
absence of treaty claims, the tribunal held that it had no 
jurisdiction.  It reasoned: 
The Tribunal is also mindful that if a distinction is not 
drawn between ordinary sales contracts, even if complex, 
and an investment, the result would be that any sales or 
procurement contract involving a State agency would 
qualify as an investment.  International contracts are today 
a central feature of international trade . . . .  Yet, those 
contracts are not investment contracts, except in exceptional 
circumstances, and are to be kept separate and distinct for 
the sake of a stable legal order.140 
The tribunal further noted that “a basic general distinction can 
be made between commercial aspects of a dispute and other 
aspects involving the existence of some forms of State interference 
with the operation of the contract involved.”141 
The tribunal also stated: 
Disputes about the release of bank guarantees are a 
common occurrence in many jurisdictions and the fact that 
a State agency might be a party to the Contract involving a 
commercial transaction of this kind does not change its 
nature.  It is still a commercial and contractual dispute to be 
settled as agreed to in the Contract, including the resort to 
arbitration if and when available.142 
Consequently the tribunal observed, concerning the umbrella 
clause: 
In this context, it could not be held that an umbrella clause 
inserted in the Treaty, and not very prominently, could 
have the effect of transforming all contract disputes into 
investment disputes under the Treaty, unless of course 
there would be a clear violation of the Treaty rights and 
obligations or a violation of contract rights of such a 
 
139 Id. para. 78. 
140 Id. para. 58. 
141 Id. para. 72. 
142 Id. para. 79. 
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magnitude as to trigger the Treaty protection, which is not 
the case.  The connection between the Contract and the 
Treaty is the missing link that prevents any such effect.  
This might be perfectly different in other cases where that 
link is found to exist, but certainly it is not the case here.143 
3.2.2.2.6. Protection for Investment Agreements: El 
Paso and PAE 
A few tribunals have averred that entering into a contractual 
relationship with an investor could trigger the protection of the 
umbrella clause, depending on the nature of the contract.  On the 
view that it is “necessary to distinguish the State as a merchant or 
as a sovereign,” the tribunals in El Paso, and its companion case 
Pan American Energy, drew particularly on the distinction between 
a contractual legal relationship between the State and the investor 
that arises due to the State acting in a commercial capacity (jus 
imperii) and a contractual legal relationship that arises due to the 
State acting in a sovereign capacity (jus gestionis).144  Apparently on 
this basis the El Paso and the PAE Tribunals declared that all 
contracts constitute either commercial contracts or investment 
agreements.145  Further, only investment agreement breaches could 
be converted to treaty breaches by the umbrella clause.  In other 
words: “[those] contract claims stemming from an investment 
agreement stricto sensu, that is an agreement in which the State 
appears as a sovereign, and not all contracts signed with the State 
or one of its entities . . . .”146 
Offering little other explicit support for this theory, the tribunal 
arrived at this conclusion in the particular case by interpreting the 
umbrella clause in Article II of the Argentine-U.S. BIT, in light of 
the dispute resolution clause, Article VII(1).  The umbrella clause 
reads: “each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered 
 
143 Id. para. 81. 
144 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/15, para. 79 (Apr. 27, 2006). 
145 Id. para. 77 (“Either the foreign investor has a commercial contract with an 
autonomous State entity or it has an investment agreement with the state, in 
which some ‘clauses exorbitantes du droit commun’ are inserted.”). 
146 Id. para. 80.  See also CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, paras. 299–300 (May 12, 2005) (noting “that not all 
contract breaches result in breaches of the treaty”). 
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into with regard to investments.”147  The dispute resolution clause 
of Article VII(1) states: 
[A]n investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and 
national or company of the other Party arising out of or 
relating to (a) an investment agreement between that Party 
and such national or company; (b) an investment 
authorization . . . or, (c) an alleged breach of any right 
conferred and created by this Treaty with respect to an 
investment.148 
Read in conjunction with the dispute resolution clause, the 
tribunal considered that the umbrella clause “will not extend the 
Treaty protection to breaches of an ordinary commercial contract 
entered into by the State or a State-owned entity, but will cover 
additional investment protections contractually agreed by the State 
as a sovereign, such as a stabilization clause inserted into an 
investment agreement.”149 
Furthermore: 
[I]n the Tribunal’s view, it is especially clear that the 
umbrella clause does not extend to any contract claims 
when such claims do not rely on a violation of the 
standards of protection of the BIT . . . unless some 
requirements are respected.  However, there is no doubt 
that if the State interferes with contractual rights by a 
unilateral act, whether these rights  stem from a contract 
entered into by a foreign investor with a private party, a 
State autonomous entity or the State itself, in such a way 
that the State’s action can be analyzed as a violation of the 
standards of protection embodied in a BIT, the treaty-based 
arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction over all the claims of 
the foreign investor, including the claims arising from a 
violation of its contractual rights. Moreover, Article II, read 
in conjunction with Article VII(1), also considers as treaty 
claims the breaches of an investment agreement between 
 
147 El Paso Energy Int’l Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, para. 81. 
148 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
149 Id. 
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Argentina and a national or company of the United 
States.150 
3.2.3. Jurisdiction for Contract Claims Under Wide Dispute 
resolution clauses 
An alternative method for seizing a treaty tribunal with a 
contract claim is to argue the claim is an “investment dispute” 
within the general consent to arbitration of investment disputes 
under the treaty.  The tribunal in Salini v. Morocco in July 2001151 
addressed the question of whether a contract claim should be 
considered an investment dispute under the Italy Morocco BIT 
referring to: “[a]ll disputes or differences, including disputes 
related to the amount of compensation due in the event of 
expropriation, nationalization, or similar measures, between a 
Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting 
Party.”152  The tribunal held that this subject matter jurisdiction 
clause included jurisdiction for contract claims in principle 
although it ultimately rejected the contract claim at issue for other 
reasons.  The tribunal reasoned:  “[t]he reference to expropriation 
and nationalisation measures, which are matters coming under the 
unilateral will of a State, cannot be interpreted to exclude a claim 
based in contract from the scope of application of this Article.”153 
The Vivendi Annulment Committee, considering the dispute 
resolution clause of the Argentine-U.S. BIT, stated as well: 
Article 8 does not use a narrower formulation, requiring 
that the investor’s claim allege a breach of the BIT itself.  
Read literally, the requirements for arbitral jurisdiction in 
Article 8 do not necessitate that the Claimant allege a 
breach of the BIT itself: it is sufficient that the dispute relate 
to an investment made under the BIT.154 
 
150 Id. para. 84.  The Tribunal positively referenced the Model BIT in coming 
to this conclusion, but did not explain why. 
151 Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/00/4 (July 23, 2001). 
152 Id. para. 15 (quoting the Italy-Morocco BIT). 
153 Id. para. 59. 
154 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Vivendi Universal (formerly 
Compagnie Générale Des Eaux), Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, para. 55 (July 3, 2002). 
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As noted above, the SGS Pakistan Tribunal declined to read the 
same meaning into Article 9 of the Swiss-Pakistani BIT, which 
referred to “disputes with respect to investments.”155  The Tribunal 
in SGS Philippines, in contrast, agreed with the claimant that the 
contract claims should also be included in the phrase “disputes 
with respect to investments” between a Contracting Party and an 
investor of the other Contracting Party.156  The Tribunals in 
Fedax,157 Impregilo,158 Tokios Tokelés,159 and Parkerings160 came to 
similar conclusions. 
3.2.4. MFN and Contract Claims Jurisdiction: Impregilo, Salini v. 
Jordan 
While the application of an MFN clause to arbitration 
procedures under BITs in general continues to be highly 
controversial,161 two tribunals have rendered decisions specifically 
on whether the investment tribunal had jurisdiction over contract 
claims by operation of an MFN clause.  In both cases the Tribunals 
declined to accept this use of the MFN clause. 
In Impregilo v. Pakistan an Italian company had entered into a 
contract for the construction of a barrage downstream of the 
Tarbela Dam with the Pakistan Water Power Development 
Authority (“WAPDA”).  The claimant argued that it could claim 
the procedural benefit of arbitration of contract claims under an 
umbrella clause in another treaty through the Most Favored Nation 
clause in Article 3 of the Italy-Pakistan BIT. After determining 
WAPDA to be separate from the government of Pakistan under 
Pakistani law, the tribunal stated: 
 
155 SGS Pakistan, Case No. ARB/01/13, paras. 149–50. 
156 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, para. 134 (Jan. 29, 2004). 
157 Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3 (Mar. 9, 
1998).  
158 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/3 (Apr. 22, 2005). 
159 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18 (July 26, 
2007). 
160 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/8 (Sept. 11, 2007). 
161 See Emanuel Gaillard, Establishing Jurisdiction Through a Most-Favored-
Nation Clause, N.Y. L.J., June 2, 2005, at 37 (explaining the lack of consistency in 
case law decisions regarding the application of Most Favored Nation status 
clauses in the area of investment arbitration). 
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[G]iven that the Contracts were concluded by Impreglio 
with WAPDA, and not with Pakistan[,] Impregilo’s reliance 
upon Article 3 of the BIT takes the matter no further.  Even 
assuming arguendo that Pakistan . . . has guaranteed the 
observance of the contractual commitments into which it 
has entered together with Italian investors, such a 
guarantee would not cover the present Contracts—since 
these are agreements into which it has not entered.162 
More significant for the present purposes is the holding of the 
Salini Tribunal, which considered the question of whether the right 
to ICSID arbitration of a contract could be awarded through a 
MFN clause despite a provision in the Jordan-Italy BIT mandating 
the use of the procedure set out in the contract (Article 9).163  The 
claimant brought both treaty and contract claims related to a 
contract for the construction of the Karameh Dam between two 
Italian companies and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation-Jordan 
Valley Authority.  According to the contract, the progress of the 
work and the amount charged therefore was to be certified by an 
Engineer appointed by the Ministry.  The dispute resolution clause 
67.3 of the contract concerned the situation when a dispute arose 
over the Engineer’s finding.  It specified arbitration was allowed if 
both parties agreed to arbitrate, provided the government party 
had to first obtain the approval of the Council of Ministers.  When 
the parties differed by approximately U.S. $28 million on the final 
amount owing under the Contracts, Salini requested arbitration 
under the aforementioned clause.  When the Council of Ministers 
decided that the Jordanian Courts should hear the dispute instead 
of allowing it to go to arbitration, Salini brought a claim before 
ICSID under the BIT. 
Salini had argued Article IX of the Jordan-U.S. BIT and Article 
6 of the Jordan-United Kingdom BIT giving U.S. investors in 
Jordan “the right to submit investment disputes with the host State 
to ICSID regardless of any clause in the investment agreement 
providing for a different dispute settlement mechanism” made 
 
162 Impreglio, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, para. 223 (citation omitted). 
163 Salini Costruttori S.p.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, para. 19 (citing 
Agreement between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government 
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, 17 July 2000, available at http://www.agreements.jedco.gov 
.jo/main/doc/Italyi96e.html).  
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available to investors of the United States and UK “a dispute 
resolution clause which is more favorable” than that of the Jordan-
Italy BIT.164  Therefore, it argued the MFN clause Article 3 of the 
Jordan-Italy BIT allowed the claimant to submit the dispute to 
ICSID arbitration.  Article 1 reads:  “Both Contracting Parties, 
within the bounds of their own territory, shall grant investments 
effected by, and the income accruing to, investors of the 
Contracting Party no less favorable treatment than that accorded to 
investments effected by, and income accruing to, its own nationals 
or investors of Third States.”165 
The Tribunal endorsed the position of Jordan that the Contracts 
were investment agreements within the meaning of the Jordan-
Italy BIT, Article 9(2) which required the disputes to use the 
procedure in the contract.  Given this, the Tribunal could find no 
intent in the MFN clause of the treaty, nor evidence from the treaty 
practice to confirm that the parties intended dispute settlement to 
be included in the MFN clause to counter the specific intent 
expressed in the treaty’s dispute resolution clause.166 
3.2.5. Another Perspective: Waiver of Treaty Arbitration 
In most of the cases above, the question of the jurisdiction of 
the arbitral Tribunal founded under an investment treaty to decide 
a contract claim for which a host-State forum has already been 
designated has been treated mainly as a question of treaty 
interpretation. The main question has been: has the Host State 
consented to treaty arbitration of the contract claim?  Some 
tribunals have approached the issue from another perspective: has 
the investor waived treaty arbitration under international law, 
either expressly or impliedly by conduct, by recognizing another 
forum for dispute resolution? 
As a general matter, the dual public/private nature of the 
rights under the BITs raises the question as to whether an 
individual is capable of waiving the public interests rights 
embodied in the treaty’s arbitration procedures.  If the right to 
investment treaty arbitration is held by the investor and the State 
of his or her nationality simultaneously, may an investor alone 
waive the State’s right to demand treaty arbitration for its 
 
164 Id. para. 20. 
165 Id. para. 66, art. 3. 
166 Id. para. 118. 
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investors?167  To the extent that tribunals believe such a waiver 
possible, most require an explicit expression of waiver of ICSID 
arbitration to be effective.168 
3.2.5.1. Waiver by Committing to the Exclusive Forum 
Selection Clause 
Respondent States have argued that by committing to the 
bargained-for forum-selection clause in the contract when a BIT is 
already in existence, the investor has waived the right to related 
treaty arbitration.  As noted in the cases above, this may be equally 
viewed as an expression of the principle of party autonomy or 
pacta sunt servanda, respected in both municipal and international 
law.  In practice, however, tribunals seldom hold an investor has 
waived investment arbitration for breach of the treaty simply by 
entering into an exclusive forum-selection agreement in a contract. 
In this many Tribunals have followed the reasoning of the Vivendi 
I Tribunal.  The Tribunal held that entering into a forum selection 
agreement as part of a contract could not constitute a waiver of 
treaty claims because the subject matter or cause of action of the 
claims was different.169 
 
167 See Ole Spierman, Individual Rights, State Interest and the Power to Waive 
ICSID Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 ARB.  INT’L  179, 206–08 
(2004): 
The question is whether the interests of the home state are sufficient to 
oppose party autonomy and deny the investor the power to waive 
international arbitration . . . . [T]he better view would seem to be that, 
unless the bilateral investment treaty contains an explicit provision to the 
contrary, there is a presumption that the investor has the power to waive 
international arbitration. 
168 Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia (Aguas), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, para. 119 (Oct. 21, 2005); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador 
(Occidental), ICISD Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 71 (Sept. 
9, 2008) (citing Aguas, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, para. 119). 
169 See generally Salini Construtorri S.p.A. v. Morocco, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, para. 49 (July 23, 2001); Azurix Corp. v. 
Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, para. 79 (Dec. 8, 2003); AES Corp. 
v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17 (Apr. 26, 
2005); Enron Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3 (Jan. 14, 2004); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Neth. V. 
Czech. Rep.), Award, (UNICITRAL Mar. 2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca 
/documents/CME-2003-Final_001.pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19 (Aug. 3, 2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 12, 2005). 
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Article 16.4 of the Concession Contract does not divest this 
Tribunal of jurisdiction to hear this case because that 
provision did not and could not constitute a waiver by CGE 
of its rights under Article 8 of the BIT to file the pending 
claims against the Argentine Republic. . . . [T]hose claims 
are not based on the Concession Contract but allege a cause 
of action under the BIT. 
Thus, Article 16.4 of the Concession Contract cannot be 
deemed to prevent the investor from proceeding under the 
ICSID Convention against the Argentine Republic on a 
claim charging the Argentine Republic with a violation of 
the Argentine-French BIT.170 
In the 1998 Lanco arbitration, the Tribunal rejected that 
argument that investors had waived treaty arbitration by entering 
into forum-selection clauses assigning the dispute to 
administrative courts of the province.171  Even while the Tribunal 
found the Concession Agreement to be an “investment agreement” 
within the meaning of the dispute resolution clause of the treaty 
requiring the use of the procedure in the investment agreement, 172 
it denied that such a forum-selection clause could express consent 
overriding ICSID jurisdiction, as administrative jurisdiction was 
not selectable under Argentine law.173  Other tribunals such as the 
one in Salini v. Morrocco have adopted Lanco’s reasoning to deny 
effect to exclusive forum selection clauses.174 
3.2.5.2. Express Waiver: Azurix and Aguas Del Tunari 
The Vivendi Annulment Committee opined that if a forum 
selection clause in a contract purports to exclude the jurisdiction of 
an international tribunal arising under the BIT, whether a 
 
170 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3, paras. 53–54 (Nov. 21, 2000). 
171 Lanco Int’l v. Argentina, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case 
No. ARB /97/6 (Dec. 8, 1998). 
172 Id. para. 20. 
173 Id. para. 19.  An opposite view on exclusive forum selection clauses is 
provided in Crawford, supra note 66, at 13 (maintaining that a treaty tribunal may 
not adjudicate a claim over an exclusive foreign selection clause in a contract and 
that “[p]acta sunt servanda is not a one-way street”). 
174  Salini Construtorri S.p.A. v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/4, para. 27 (July 16, 2001). 
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contractual claim or a treaty claim, a clear indication of intent to 
exclude jurisdiction would be required.175  The Azurix case176 
considered whether express waiver of all other fora in the 
contractual documentation for the bidding for a water purification 
project pursuant to a privatization plan precluded ICSID 
jurisdiction.  Azurix’s request for arbitration alleged multiple 
violations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT but no contract claims. 
Argentina objected to jurisdiction on the grounds that all of the 
contractual documentation relating to the investment provided 
“for all disputes that may arise out of the bidding” an express 
waiver of “any other forum, jurisdiction or immunity that may 
correspond.”  This waiver was annexed to each of the respective 
forum selection clauses that committed to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the courts of contentious administrative matters of the city of La 
Plata.177  Argentina also objected that a Clarification Circular by the 
Privatization Commission had affirmed to some bidding 
participants that the forum selection clause in the documents were 
an express waiver of ICSID jurisdiction.178 
Azurix argued, inter alia, that the two claims were based on 
different sources of rights, and that if it had made a waiver, it was 
only concerning contractual rights, not claims.179  It also objected 
on the grounds that the Argentine Republic was not a party to the 
Concession Agreements.  Azurix also observed that Argentina’s 
court structure in any case precluded Azurix from bringing a BIT 
claim in provincial courts, while Article VII(2) of the BIT the 
dispute resolution clause allowed the investor to choose between 
national courts, a previously agreed upon forum or ICSID 
arbitration.180 
The Azurix tribunal held that the inclusion of an express waiver 
“has not made a substantive difference to the exclusive forum 
clause included in the concessions agreements considered by 
ICSID Tribunals in Lanco or Vivendi I, since the acceptance of the 
 
175 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on 
Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, para. 76 (July 3, 2002), reprinted in 6 
ICSID (W. Bank) 340 (2004). 
176 Azurix, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12. 
177 Id. para. 26. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. para. 32. 
180 Id. para. 35. 
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exclusivity of a forum implies by definition the renunciation of any 
other fora whether or not explicitly stated in the clause.”181  
Furthermore, the Tribunal points out “that the rights under the 
Concession Agreement and under the BIT are not the same and 
that the generality of the waiver would exclude even the courts at 
the federal level which would normally be competent to consider 
claims against the Respondent.”  The court ultimately holds that 
the waiver does not apply to the claim Azurix brought before the 
tribunal. 
On the other hand, the Aguas del Tunari Tribunal182 
distinguished express waivers and exclusive forum selection 
clauses in its analysis.183  In principle, the Tribunal considered that 
if the host State and the investor agreed separately to waive ICSID 
arbitration expressly, such a waiver would be effective.184  As to 
exclusive forum selection clauses, following the Vivendi Ad Hoc 
Committee, the Tribunal denied that a forum-selection clause 
could affect the jurisdiction of a BIT tribunal.  “The Tribunal is of 
the view that it is not the existence of the exclusive forum selection 
clause that would be given effect by an ICSID tribunal, but rather 
that the tribunal could, at most, give effect to a waiver implied 
from the existence of an exclusive forum selection clause.”185  After 
accepting the Claimant’s argument that the clause in the 
Concession Contract at issue was not a true forum selection 
agreement specifically excluding other fora, in dicta it went on to 
opine that an exclusive forum selection clause could at least 
arguably be deemed a waiver of treaty arbitration, provided that it 
must deal with “the same matters and Parties and contain 
conflicting obligations.”186  But an exclusive forum selection clause 
alone would need separate, more conclusive proof of the parties’ 
 
181 Id. para. 80. 
182 Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia (Aguas), Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/3 (Oct. 21, 2005) (holding that there is not sufficient evidence to 
support an allegation of abuse of corporate form or fraud). 
183 Id. para. 118. 
184 Id. Para 114 n.89 (citing Article 26 of the ICSID convention as proof that 
this was the prevailing view at the time of the Washington Convention after 
Spiermann). 
185 Id. para. 119. 
186 Id. para. 111. 
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intent for the Tribunal to infer a waiver.187  “A separate conflicting 
document should be held to affect the jurisdiction of an ICSID 
Tribunal only if it clearly is intended to modify the jurisdiction 
otherwise granted to ICSID.”188 
3.2.5.3. Treaty-Based Waiver: Fork-in-the-Road Clauses 
The waiver question also arises when an investor has actually 
submitted the dispute to the designated forum before invoking 
treaty arbitration.  In many cases, a treaty may explicitly provide 
that a waiver will be deemed when an investor submits an 
investment dispute to a national court under the treaty’s “fork-in-
the-road” clause.  Intended to promote finality of decisions in the 
two separate systems of law, municipal and international,189 a fork-
in-the-road clause says that once an investor has submitted a claim 
to domestic tribunals, the investor has made a final election and 
has waived his or her right to bring the claim to treaty arbitration 
and vice versa.  In the main, the investment treaty arbitral 
decisions have required identity of parties, subject matter and 
causes of action to give effect to a fork-in-the-road clause in a 
treaty.190  Thus, these tribunals have held that a prior submission of 
a contract claim would not cause a treaty claim to be waived. 
3.3. Conclusion 
From the foregoing we see that attempts by investors to recover 
on breach of contract claims against host States under BITs have 
met scarce success.  BIT tribunals have mainly broadly justified 
denying contract claims jurisdiction in terms of traditional public 
international law and treaty interpretation, imposing a high bar to 
 
187 See id. paras. 118–19 (explaining that, absent an indication of the parties’ 
specific intent to waive jurisdiction, ICSID has the “duty” to exercise jurisdiction). 
188  Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador (Occidental), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ICISD Case No. ARB/06/11, para. 71 (Sept. 9, 2008). 
189 See, e.g., Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/09 (Oct. 21, 2003) (finding that a prior submission activated fork-in-the-
road clause). 
190 See, e.g., Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina (Vivendi 
Annulment), Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, para 113 (July 
3, 2002), reprinted in 19 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 89 (2004) (discussing 
fork-in-the-road clause); Azurix, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, paras. 87–90 (stating 
that the identity of parties, object, and cause of action were required to trigger the 
fork-in-the-road provision). 
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find State consent for such arbitrations.  Umbrella clauses and 
general dispute resolution clauses have often been found to be too 
vague to justify independent contract claims jurisdiction in the face 
of the predicted impact on the integrity and stability of the 
international and domestic legal orders, the burden on respondent 
States, and the renunciation of judicial authority by the host State 
that would be implied by such an interpretation of the BIT. 
As the presentation below of the key provisions on the 
arbitration of investment agreement shows, the Model BIT 
attempts to anchor jurisdiction for treaty arbitration of concession 
contracts within this legal discourse while presenting a 
compromise to the full internationalization of State contracts.  And 
yet, such a compromise is likely to raise similar objections as those 
raised by the tribunals above to contract claims jurisdiction, along 
with other, new ones, which will be discussed in the section that 
follows. 
4. INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS UNDER THE 2004 U.S. 
MODEL BIT: AN UNEASY COMPROMISE? 
Contrary to the current practice in treaty arbitration discussed 
above, in the U.S. Model BIT, the United States has put forth a 
procedural mechanism specifically to arbitrate concession 
agreement claims in investment treaty tribunals through the 
standing offer of consent to arbitrate in the DRC.  Although it is too 
early to say whether the text of the investment agreement 
provisions is likely to become as widely adopted in other 
investment treaties as the umbrella clause has been, considering 
the recent dynamic ongoing growth of BITs and FTAs particularly 
in Asia, counterparties to treaties with these clauses should 
carefully consider the wording of the DRC. 
In drafting BITs, a principal problem for States is how much 
protection for investors is necessary to induce foreign investment 
for economic growth without sacrificing too much sovereign policy 
discretion.  Also of special concern these days is unduly exposing 
the State to expensive litigation.  As demonstrated by the $128 
million award against Argentina for violating treaty commitments 
inter alia the umbrella clause in September 2007,191 the balancing 
game played by States concluding investment treaties is 
 
191  Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina (Sempra Award), Award, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/16 (Sept. 28, 2007). 
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increasingly fraught with peril.  Considering these stakes, it is 
noteworthy then that the United States has chosen to delegate its 
judicial powers to private arbitrators for investment agreement 
claims as set out in the treaty’s dispute resolution clause, thereby 
constraining its policy options in this area of potentially strong 
public interest.  Whether the outcome will be consistent with the 
stated overall goal of the Model BIT of promoting a “stable 
framework for investment,”192 is far from clear. 
4.1. The Structure of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT 
The Model BIT was devised to either stand alone as a bilateral 
investment treaty or constitute an investment chapter of a 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.  The key substantive 
obligations described in Section A are as follows: 
National treatment (Article 3); Treatment no less favorable 
than that of the investors  of the most favored-nation (MFN 
Article 4); Free transfer of profits (Article 7); Minimum 
standard of treatment for investors and investments under 
customary international law (including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security) (Article 5); and 
Fair market value compensation in case of legal 
expropriation (Article 6)193 
4.2. The Dispute Resolution Clause: The Agreement to Arbitrate for 
Investment Agreement Claims 
The procedural conditions for the States’ consent to arbitrate an 
investment dispute are set out in Article 26.  Article 26 requires a 
claim to take place within three years of when the claimant first 
acquired, or should have first acquired knowledge of the breach.194  
It also declares a six-month waiting period and sets out certain 
notification requirements before bringing the claim. 
4.2.1. The Subject Matter Jurisdiction Clause 
Article 24 of the Model BIT authorizes three types of claims 
which may be claimed alone or together:  a breach of a substantive 
 
192 Model BIT, supra note 3, pmbl. 
193 Model BIT, supra note 3, Sec. A. 
194 Id. art. 26. 
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obligation under Article 24(1)(a)(i)(A) and a breach of an 
investment agreement under Article 24(1)(a)(i)(C) or investment 
authorization195 under Article 24(1)(a)(i)(B).  A claim may be made 
by the claimant on his own behalf or “on behalf of an enterprise of 
the respondent that is a juridical person that the claimant owns or 
controls directly or indirectly.”196  In contrast to treaty claims under 
Article 24(1)(a)(i)(A), a breach of an investment agreement claim 
clearly refers to a type of claim that can be considered 
contractual.197  An investment authorization, bearing formal 
resemblance to a license, can be considered an explicit assurance 
regarding an investment.  There are no limitations on whether the 
two types of claims may be raised independently or in 
combination. 
4.2.2. Claims for Breach of an Investment Agreement 
4.2.2.1. Definition of Investment Agreement 
An investment agreement is a written agreement198 with a 
national authority199 that grants rights to the covered investment or 
investor: 
(a) with respect to natural resources that the national 
authority controls, such as for their exploration, extraction, 
refining, transportation, distribution, or sale; 
 
195 See id., art. 1 (“‘Investment authorization’ means an authorization that the 
foreign investment authority of a Party grants to a covered investment or an 
investor of the other Party.”). 
196 Id. art. 24(1)(b). 
197 See also Crawford, supra note 66, at 15 (discussing breach of contract 
claims). 
198 Model BIT, supra note 3, Section A, n.4: 
[A] written agreement refers to an agreement in writing . . . that creates 
an exchange of rights and obligations, binding on both parties under the 
law applicable under Article 30[Governing Law](2).  For greater 
certainty, (a) a unilateral act of an administrative or judicial authority, 
such as a permit, license or authorization issued by a Party solely in its 
regulatory capacity, a decree, order or judgment, standing alone; and (b) 
an administrative or judicial consent decree or order, shall not be 
considered a written agreement. 
199 “For purposes of this definition, ‘national authority’ means (a) for the 
United States, an authority at the central  level of government . . .” Id. Sec. A, n.5. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/5
2010] INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS 989 
 
(b) to supply services the public on behalf of the Party, such 
as power generation or distribution, water treatment or 
distribution or telecommunications; or 
(c) to undertake infrastructure projects, such as the 
construction of roads, bridges, canals, dams, or pipelines, 
that are not for the exclusive or predominant use and  
benefit of the government.200 
4.2.2.2. The Underlying Qualified Investment Requirement 
As a threshold matter, a claim for the breach of an investment 
agreement must relate directly to a qualified investment that was 
acquired in reliance on the investment agreement and that was 
harmed as a result of the breach of the investment agreement.201  
The definition of investment specifies loosely some typical 
characteristics of investments for which a broad array of assets 
may qualify. 
Investment means “every asset that an investor owns or 
controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an 
investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of 
capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
assumption of risk.”202 
This is supplemented by a non-exhaustive list of “forms that an 
investment might take,” including certain types of contract rights: 
(a) an enterprise; 
 
200 Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 1. 
201 A qualification to Article 24’s subject matter jurisdiction clause reads: 
Provided that a claimant may submit pursuant to subparagraph (a)(i)(C) 
or (b)(i)(C)a claim for breach of an investment agreement only if the 
subject matter of the claim and the claimed damages directly relate to the 
covered investment that was established or acquired, or sought to be 
established or acquired, in reliance on the relevant investment 
agreement. 
Id. art. 24.  This appears to harmonize the investment agreement clause with the 
requirements of Article 25(1) of the ICSID convention that confers jurisdiction to 
the ICSID Tribunal to “legal disputes arising directly out of an investment.”  
ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 25(1). 
202 Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 1. 
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(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in 
an enterprise; 
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; 
(d) futures, options and other derivatives; 
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, 
concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts 
(f) intellectual property rights; 
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights 
conferred pursuant to domestic law; and 
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable 
property, and related property rights, such as leases, 
mortgages, liens and pledges.203 
While some forms are “more likely to have the 
characteristics of an investment,” other forms “such as claims 
to payment that are immediately due and result from the sale 
of goods or services, are less likely to have such 
characteristics.”204 
Of special significance to countries with federal systems is the 
fact, that although an investment agreement may be entered into 
only with the national government, an action by a local 
government, such as a refusal to issue a permit, could be the cause 
of the breach of the investment agreement by the national 
government.  In such cases, the claim might still be maintained 
against the national government under Article 4 of the ILC Articles 
on State Responsibility.205  Another notable aspect is that there is 
no threshold showing of harm required to prove a breach of an 
investment agreement requiring compensation. 
 
203 Id. 
204 Id. art. 1. 
205 See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (Metalclad), Award, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para. 73 (Aug. 30, 2000) (explaining that this was the scenario 
in Metalclad’s expropriation claim against Mexico). 
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4.2.2.3. Conditions and Limitations to Bringing a Claim: 
Waiver of Domestic Litigation 
In either type of claim, Article 26 requires a claimant to provide 
along with a 90-day prior written notice of intent to arbitrate a 
written waiver of “any right to initiate or continue before any 
administrative Tribunal or court under the law of either Party, or 
other dispute settlement procedures, any proceeding with respect 
to any measure alleged to constitute a breach referred to in Article 
24.”206 
This important clause performs a similar function to the lis 
pendens doctrines in domestic law requiring a Tribunal to abstain 
from taking up a case that is currently being litigated and 
preventing the claimant from engaging in parallel litigation.  
Claimants may continue to request injunctive relief only, 
“provided that the action is brought for the sole purpose of 
preserving the claimant’s or the enterprise’s rights and interests 
during the pendency of arbitration.”  However, in contrast to the 
lis pendens doctrine requiring only identity of parties, cause of 
action, and subject matter, this provision encompasses all related 
claims arising from the challenged government measure. 
4.2.2.4. Governing Law of Investment Agreement Claims 
The Governing Law Article 30 covering the substantive law of 
the arbitration states that if the claim is for a breach of an 
investment agreement, the Tribunal “shall apply:” 
(a) the rules of law specified in the pertinent investment 
authorization or investment agreement, or as the 
disputing parties may otherwise agree; or 
(b) if the rules of law have not been specified or otherwise 
agreed: 
 (i) the law of the respondent, including its rules on 
the  conflict of laws, and 
 
206 Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 26(2)(b)(ii). 
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 (ii)  such rules of international law as may be 
applicable.207 
Thus placing heavy reliance on the principle of party 
autonomy, an investment agreement claim will be decided by “the 
rule” as agreed upon by the parties to the contract.  The term “the 
rule” is broad enough to include, as sources of decision, the law of 
a country, public international law, or another system such as the 
lex mercatoria or the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts. 
The extent to which international law is applicable in the 
unlikely case that the rules of law have not been agreed to is within 
the discretion of the tribunal.  In this context, the drafters of this 
clause on the governing law of the investment agreement 
arbitration appear to have drawn on ICSID Article 42(1), which 
provides: 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such 
rules of law as may be agreed by the parties.  In the absence 
of  such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the 
 Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules 
on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law 
as may be applicable.208 
A debate has long existed about the second sentence of ICSID 
Article 42(1), as to whether international law should operate only if 
there is a lacuna in domestic law or whether it should operate as a 
corrective to domestic law.209  Some commentators interpret “and” 
to mean that the tribunal is mandated to apply both domestic and 
international law.  Tribunals have frequently adopted this 
 
207 Id. art. 30(2).  In the case of a breach of a substantive obligation, the 
dispute shall be decided “in accordance with this Treaty and the applicable rules 
of international law.”  Id. art. 30(2). 
208 ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 42(1). 
209 See generally, Emannuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of “And” 
in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of the Washington Convention: The Role of 
International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT L.J. 375 (2003) (discussing choice of law under Article 42(1)); 
Domenico Di Pietro, Applicable Law under Article 42 of the ICSID Convention: The 
Case of Amco v. Indonesia, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: 
LEADING CASES FROM ICSID, NAFTA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005) (examining the 
increasing role of public international law in resolving investment disputes). 
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concurrent approach and used international law to resolve certain 
issues in disputes over agreements governed by domestic law.210  
Recently under the influence of the Vivendi holding, “an issue 
specific” approach has been advocated.  Where the claim raised by 
the parties concerns a right or obligation defined under domestic 
law, domestic law will be used, and where the right or obligation 
arises under international law, international law will be used.211 
Regardless of the approach adopted by the Tribunal, it is clear that 
the tribunal is obligated at a minimum to identify the issue, the law 
applied, and the outcome of the analysis.212 
However, the award will not be annulled for errors in 
application of the law. 
[A] tribunal’s disregard of the agreed rules of law would 
constitute a derogation from the terms of reference within 
which the tribunal has been authorized to function . . . . 
Disregard of the applicable rules of law must be 
distinguished from erroneous application of those rules 
which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no 
ground for annulment.213 
4.2.3. The Award Clause 
The Model BIT’s Article 34(1) permits the Tribunal to award 
separately or in combination, only 
(a) monetary damages and any applicable interest; and 
 
210 CME Czech Republic (Neth. v. Czech Rep.), UNCITRAL Arb., paras. 167–
91, U.N. Doc. 403/LERMERK/2001 (2001); LG&E v. Argentina, Decision on 
Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, para. 93 (Oct. 3, 2006)  (stating that obviating 
the application of international law would mean ignoring that “international 
treaties move away from the principle according to which foreign investment is 
subject to the law and jurisdiction of the host state and seek international solution 
of conflicts”). 
211 The award of the Tribunal in Duke Energy, which found a violation of an 
umbrella clause and of the fair and equitable treatment obligation, exemplifies 
this approach. See Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Ecuador (Duke Energy), 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, paras. 315–488 (Aug. 18, 2008). 
212 CME Czech Republic, para. 197 (discussing the consequences of applying 
improper law). 
213 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Annulment Decision, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 50 (Sept. 25, 2007). 
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(b) restitution of property, in which case the award shall 
provide that the respondent may pay monetary 
damages and any applicable interest in lieu of 
restitution. 
A Tribunal may also award costs and attorney’s fees, while 
punitive damages are specifically disallowed.214  The award clause 
does not distinguish between treaty and investment agreement 
claims.  In fact, it is not clear that the award clause applies to a 
breach of an investment agreement claim at all if the governing law 
of the investment agreement is host state law. 
In the BIT arbitrations with concurrent treaty and contract 
claims so far, remedies from the treaty damage clause were only 
allowed on a showing of a violation of international law.215  Does 
the injunction to use “the rule” in the investment agreement to 
decide the claim extend to the calculation of damages?  In the case 
that the investment agreement itself refers to liquidated damages 
or incorporates statutory remedies, is the tribunal constrained to 
award damages according to the “rule” in the investment 
agreement itself to the exclusion of damages under the award 
clause?  Since the private party recovery under public contracting 
laws is typically significantly less than for commercial contracts, 
the difference could be considerable.216 
Investors could claim damages for an investment agreement 
claim as extensive as the full market value of the investment as 
measured by present discounted value of future profits, which 
roughly corresponds to expectation damages for private contracts 
under “general principles of international law.”  This is another 
area where the investment agreement claims provisions will inject 
uncertainty into investment arbitration. 
 
214 Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 34(3) (“A tribunal may not award punitive 
damages”). 
215  See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the 
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 24, 2004) (involving a legal dispute 
between a foreign investor and a host state); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, Award on Merits, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4 (Dec. 8, 2000) (involving a 
dispute that arose from obligations to develop and manage two hotels). 
216 See Bowett, supra note 40, at 50 (comparing international standards of 
compensation for expropriation with U.S. laws on the termination of public 
contracts). 
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4.2.3. Summary 
The provisions on investment agreements in the DRC give rise 
to simultaneous duties of signatory States as follows: 
1) Each State owes to qualified investors of the other treaty 
party a duty to arbitrate an investment agreement claim 
when the investor perfects consent by the terms of the 
treaty; 
2) Each State owes a duty to the other Treaty party as a 
Treaty obligation to not interfere with the arbitration and 
provide for recognition of the award and enforcement 
when applied for on the State’s territory; and 
3) Each State is obliged to afford compensation for a breach 
of an investment agreement to investors of the other 
party.217 
To raise an investment agreement claim, a qualified investor 
must show that there was a breach of a contract between an 
investor and a State granting rights to provide public services, 
develop natural resources or build infrastructure for public use. 
The investor must have made a qualified investment in reliance on 
the investment agreement; and the claim must relate directly to 
harm to the underlying investment caused by the breach of the 
investment agreement. 
Is a breach of an investment agreement an international 
wrongdoing under the DRC?  It can be argued that the treaty 
parties intended that a breach of an investment agreement would 
engage State responsibility following the reasoning of the 
Impreglio, El Paso and PAE cases, because the definition of 
investment agreements corresponds to contracts concluded by the 
State exercising specifically sovereign powers, such as granting 
rights to natural resources or to offer public services.218  However, 
 
217 Model BIT, supra note 3, arts. 23–36. 
218 See El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/15 (Apr. 27, 2006) (involving a case wherein an umbrella clause 
was interpreted as extending treaty protection to special “investment protections 
contractually agreed by the State as sovereign”); Pan Am. Energy LLC v. 
Argentina, Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/18 (July 27, 2006) 
(holding that the contested provision in the agreement could not be considered an 
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this conclusion would not be warranted.  First, the main reason for 
singling out and explicitly defining investment agreements must 
be to eliminate any ambiguity as to the State’s consent to the 
relinquishment of sovereign authority over the adjudication of 
these contracts traditionally in the realm of domestic adjudication.  
Secondly, the DRC’s structure separating the investment 
agreement claim provisions from the substantive obligation section 
of the treaty obviates any inference of State responsibility for 
breach of an investment agreement.  Finally, it is hard to find 
support for such a theory in customary international law, which 
has tended to emphasize the nature of the act causing the breach 
rather than the nature of the contract at issue.219  Neither would 
such an interpretation accord with the majority opinion in treaty 
tribunals. 
Even though the investment agreement provisions do not 
automatically invoke State responsibility in international 
investment agreement claims, overall they represent a 
compromise220 on the internationalization issue.  The investment 
agreement prong of the subject matter jurisdiction clause embodies 
the modern version of the umbrella clause whose purpose is to 
externalize concession contract claims from host State judicial 
processes.  Moreover, using a general formulation for breach of an 
investment agreement originally derived for any kind of ICSID 
investment dispute, the governing law clause authorizes tribunals 
to substitute international law for domestic law to certain aspects 
of the investment agreement claim.  In as much as investment 
tribunals have largely prevented the application of international 
law to concession contracts by rejecting contract claims altogether 
in investment treaty arbitration, the governing law clause marches 
one step further down the road of internationalization of State 
contracts.  This compromise will leave the door open for investors 
and their lawyers to further explicate the body of transnational law 
for State contract claims in opposition to doctrines upholding the 
 
umbrella clause which would change contract claims into breaches of 
international law). 
219 See Amerasinghe, supra note 52, at 884 (describing state breaches of 
contracts with aliens). 
220 See Crawford, supra note 66, at 3, 20 (describing the Model BIT’s DRC as 
the “the integrationist approach” to international law). 
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sovereignty of States in public contracting and the disposition of 
natural resources.221 
4.3. A Short List of Issues Raised for Arbitral Tribunals 
The investment agreement provisions present an acute case of 
what Zachary Douglass has described as a “symmetrical 
jurisdictional conflict.”222  A symmetrical jurisdictional conflict 
occurs when a treaty tribunal exercises jurisdiction over a claim 
with a cause of action in municipal law.  In contrast to previous 
cases with concurrent treaty and contract claims, these cases 
asserting a breach of an investment agreement may involve an 
identity of party, claim and subject matter with a domestic contract 
claim.  Consequently, tribunals will be faced with conflicting legal 
mandates that have not been dealt with directly in treaty 
arbitration before. 
4.3.1. Forum Selection Clauses 
For example, what effect should be given the designation of a 
home State forum for resolution of disputes in the investment 
agreement when the triple identity conditions are satisfied?  With 
no express clarification that the treaty overrides forum selection 
clauses in investment agreement claims, the text of the DRC is 
generally inconclusive as to the treatment of such clauses.  A case 
can be made that the tribunal should honor the forum in the 
dispute resolution of the investment agreements as the 
consensually agreed upon “rule” of the investment agreement.  In 
support of this approach, the fundamental basis of an investment 
agreement claim is a contract: under the reasoning of the Vivendi 
Ad Hoc and the Woodruff Tribunals, the claim should be 
submitted to the forum designated in the contract and the 
investment treaty tribunal would lack jurisdiction.  If the tribunal 
takes the position that its jurisdiction cannot be abrogated by a 
matter of municipal law because this might allow the home State to 
evade its international law obligation to arbitrate the investment 
 
221 See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 
para. 36 (Sept. 9, 2008) (demonstrating that, in addition to the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty over resources, host States have also mounted defenses, 
mostly unsuccessfully, based on mandatory laws forbidding the commercial 
arbitration of public contracts). 
222 Douglas, supra note 64, at 241–56. 
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agreement claim, then the investor should be held to have waived 
treaty arbitration.  This logically follows because with the triple 
identity condition met, there should be no need for an explicit 
waiver of the investment agreement claim.  From this perspective, 
a designation of a home State tribunal in the forum selection clause 
would call for a stay, as in the SGS Philippines case.223 
On the other hand, in countries where administrative 
resolution in domestic courts is not selectable or is part of the 
mandatory laws of the host State, claimants may argue (as in 
Occidental Petroleum) that the forum-selection clause cannot express 
consent.224  In this case, the DRC could be viewed as the only true 
expression of consent (the rule “as otherwise agreed” under the 
governing law clause) and as lex specialis.  Under this reasoning, 
the tribunal would be bound to take up the investment agreement 
claim in spite of a forum selection clause. 
4.3.2. Consideration of Previous Decisions by National Courts 
Another critical legal issue the tribunal will face for the first 
time is whether a tribunal exercise its jurisdiction over an 
investment agreement claim when a national tribunal has already 
rendered a decision on the same contract dispute, and if so, under 
what conditions?  The 2004 Model BIT does not contain a “fork in 
the road” clause, and although some treaties relying on it such as 
the Korean-United States Free Trade Agreement have incorporated 
such clauses, investment agreement claims are expressly not 
covered.  By omission, the DRC would seem to allow a “second 
bite” for previously litigated investment agreement claims in some 
situations.  Provided the conditions of the domestic waiver 
requirements of Article 11.18 are met, if the investment agreement 
claim has already been dealt with in a domestic forum, the DRC 
does not by itself bar alternative treaty tribunal jurisdiction over 
the investment agreement claim. 
However, for an international tribunal to assume concurrent 
jurisdiction over such a contract claim without allowing the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies is contrary to customary 
international law. 
 
223 See id. at 283 (discussing “stay test” based on whether the “fundamental 
basis of the claim” is an investment contract or a treaty). 
224 See Occidental Petroleum Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, para. 36 
(examining the Tribunal’s claims to jurisdiction over the case). 
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When the act complained of is a breach of local law only, 
then it is only the subsequent conduct of the state of the 
forum which can create responsibility.  If the authorities 
there interfere with the course of justice or certain 
standards are not observed, then a denial of justice has 
occurred and responsibility results from it.225 
In treaty arbitration practice, although the ICSID convention 
provides that the participant States have waived the domestic 
remedies requirement, tribunals have nevertheless been generally 
hesitant to review the decisions of domestic courts on matters of 
domestic law at any stage of litigation.  Two cases in particular 
illustrate this point.226 
In the Lowen case, the claimant alleged a denial of justice under 
NAFTA’s minimum standard of treatment provision Article 1105 
when the Mississippi Supreme Court required the claimant to post 
125% of the judgment to stay the execution of an adverse award, in 
this case amounting to $625 million dollars.  The treaty tribunal 
rejected the claimants’ allegation of denial of justice because the 
Mississippi court order lacked the requisite “finality of action” that 
would allow for it to assume jurisdiction over the claim.  In other 
words, because the claimant had not sought U.S. Supreme Court 
review, the treaty tribunal would not consider the denial of justice 
claim.227 
In the Mondev case, a claimant similarly claimed a breach of the 
obligation to provide the minimum standard of treatment required 
by NAFTA Article 1105 based on rejection of its claims in the 
domestic court system.  When a real estate developer that Mondev 
came to own filed suit against the City of Boston and Boston 
Redevelopment Authority over a real estate assessment a contract, 
the Massachusetts court dismissed the claim holding that the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority had sovereign immunity.  In 
contrast to the Lowen case, however, the decision of the 
 
225 BROWNLIE, supra note 49, at 497. 
226 See Benjamin Klafter, International Commercial Arbitration as Appellate 
Review: NAFTA Chapter 11, Exhaustion of Local Remedies and Res Judicata, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, 409, 417–29 (2006) (presenting the Lowen and the Mondev 
cases as instances wherein tribunals refused to review domestic court decisions). 
227 See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, 
para. 144 (Oct. 11, 2002) (discussing the international jurisprudence on the 
immunities of public authorities). 
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was final under U.S. law 
and the claimant had exhausted all remedies in the U.S. Court 
System.  Deferring to the Massachusetts court, the NAFTA 
Tribunal stated: 
[I]t is one thing to deal with unremedied acts of the local 
constabulary and another to second-guess the reasoned 
decisions of the highest courts of a State.  Under NAFTA, 
parties have the option to seek local remedies.  If they do so 
and lose on the merits it is not the function of NAFTA 
tribunals to act as courts of appeal.228 
The Tribunal went further, saying that “[w]ithin broad limits, the 
extent to which a State decides to immunize regulatory authorities 
from suit for interference with contractual relations is a matter for 
the competent organs of the State to decide.”229 
These decisions underscore the delicate balance treaty tribunals 
must strike when confronted with jurisdictional conflicts.  The 
matter is much more complicated when both the domestic tribunal 
and the treaty tribunal have concurrent jurisdiction over a contract 
claim.  Although res judicata is recognized in both municipal and 
international law, international law tribunals are not required to 
give res judicata effect to municipal law decisions.  If a treaty 
tribunal assumes jurisdiction over an investment agreement claim 
based on a contract governed by domestic law, even if it exercises 
strong deference to the decisions of national tribunals, it is unlikely 
it can avoid theoretical conflict entirely.  Because tribunals will be 
applying an uncertain mix of international and domestic law in an 
area traditionally reserved for domestic law under the relatively 
lax standards of review in the investment arbitration system, the 
provisions could produce conflicting and unstable outcomes in 
fairly common investment situations for some time.  With these 
consequences, a strong international policy argument can be made 
that tribunals should not take up previously litigated investment 
agreement claims:  1) unless or until a treaty claim such as denial of 
justice is simultaneously claimed or 2) the parties originally 
 
228 Id. para. 126 (proposing that the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule be 
introduced NAFTA arbitration); see also Gus van Harlen & Martin Coughlin, 
Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. 
INT’L L., 121, 121–50 (2006) (asserting that investment treaty arbitration is a 
powerful form of international administrative law review). 
229 Mondev Int’l Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/(4f)/99/2 para. 154. 
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specified international arbitration under international law in the 
investment agreement. 
4.3.3. The Relationship between the Investment Agreement Breach 
and Treaty Breaches 
Arbitral tribunals will have to consider what role the Treaty 
Parties expected the investment agreement claims to play in 
relationship to the other substantive obligations for investor 
protection set out in the treaty.  Considering the many cases230 in 
which concession contract investors have successfully protected 
their legitimate investment-backed expectations concerning their 
concession project by asserting a breach of fair and equitable 
treatment, there is a clear need in applying the investment 
agreement claims to distinguish them from the other treaty 
protections in the international law context.  In contemporary 
investment treaty practice, a claim for fair and equitable treatment 
covers both a denial of justice and a discriminatory breach of an 
investment agreement.  Since the breach of an investment 
agreement is not per se internationally wrongful, one such 
distinction may be the applicability of the treaty’s damage award 
clause to the respective types of claims.  In the following Section, I 
argue the preferable interpretation is one that limits the relief that 
an investor claiming a breach of an investment agreement may 
receive under the award clause to breaches that amount to clear 
violations of international law or the treaty provisions.  
Additionally, the investment agreement claim provisions may 
under some conditions grant some additional protection to 
investors when States have committed to a valid stabilization 
clause in the investment agreement. 
5. INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS AND THE POLICE POWERS OF 
STATES 
As discussed above, under the broadest interpretation, 
investment agreement provisions would make any government 
action in violation of the investment agreement that impose 
financial burdens on a related investment a form of compensable 
liability.  The definition of investment is broad enough to ensnare 
unwary governments in unexpected and expensive treaty 
 
230 See cases cited supra note 85 (involving jurisdictional decisions regarding 
breach of contract claims). 
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arbitration litigation for run-of-the-mill environmental regulation.  
Considering the competitive pressures developing country States 
face to induce multinational foreign investment and the amount of 
money at stake in investment arbitration relative to the fiscal 
resources of such States, these treaty commitments are likely to 
substantially hinder the already weak enforcement of 
environmental and health regulation in developing States that 
become signatories.  But should governments be expected to waive 
their rights to respond to scientific discoveries concerning health 
and the environment over many decades for fear of punitive 
investment arbitration? 
5.1. Expropriation and Non-Discriminatory Regulation in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration 
5.1.1. Experience prior to the U.S. Model BIT 
NAFTA purports to address environmental concerns in Article 
12 (also in the U.S. Model BIT): 
Article 12: Investment and Environment.  The Parties 
recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by weakening or reducing the protections affected in 
domestic environmental laws.  Accordingly, each Party 
shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise 
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate 
from, such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the 
protections afforded in those laws as an encouragement for 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention of an 
investment in its territory.  If a Party considers that the 
other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may 
request consultation with the other Party and the two 
Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such 
encouragement. 
2.  Nothing in this treaty shall be construed to prevent a 
Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise inconsistent with this Treaty that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its 
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns. 
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This language did not stem the cascade of investor claims 
challenging environmental or health regulations as indirect 
expropriations or as breaches of the obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment,231 most often for indirect expropriation.  (Nor have these 
clauses figured much in those arbitrations.)  The line between 
compensable indirect expropriations and non-compensable 
regulation is not clear in international law: not all regulations may 
be considered indirect expropriations.232  In particular, much 
authority supports the conclusion that in order to be found a 
compensable expropriation, a regulation must contain a 
discriminatory element. 
Article 1 of the Protocol 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights states: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of its possessions.  No one should be deprived of 
 
231 See SCOTT SINCLAIR, CANADIAN CTR. FOR POL’Y ALTERNATIVES, NAFTA 
CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES (2008); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NAFTA 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm 
(summarizing cases filed under NAFTA involving the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada); Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998) (challenging ban on MMT); Sunbelt Water v. Canada, 38 
I.L.M. 698 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998) (discussing water protection 
legislation); Chemtura Corp. v. Canada (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2001) 
(discussing ban on pesticide lindane); Albert Connolly v. Canada, Notice of Intent 
to Submit a Claim to Arbitration (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2004) (discussing 
order under natural heritage protection program); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30, 2000) (discussing failure to 
grant operating permit pursuant to waste management regulations, designation of 
site as ecological buffer zone); Glamis Gold v. United States, Award (NAFTA Ch. 
11 Arb. Trib. 2003) (relating to preservation of Indian sacred sites in a mining 
operation); Methanex v. United States (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 2005) 
(challenging California ban on MTBE); Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. 
v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003) (challenging 
the revocation of a permit for a toxic waste facility).  Dow Chemical recently 
announced the application for NAFTA arbitration to challenge a Canadian 
pesticide ban.  Also in progress is Baird v. United States, Notice of Intent to 
Submit a Claim to Arbitration (NAFTA Ch. 11. Arb. Trib. 2002) in which an 
investor owning a patent in the U.S. for the disposal of toxic chemicals alleges that 
this “investment” has been expropriated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1995, 
1997, and 1999. 
232 See Catherine Yannaca-Small, “Indirect Expropriations” and the “Right to 
Regulate” in International Investment Law (OECD Working Paper No. 2004/4, 2004) 
(discussing indirect expropriation in international investment law). 
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his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by the law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
The proceeding provisions shall not, however, in any way 
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties.233 
The Commentary to the American Restatement of the Law of 
Foreign Relations similarly provides in this context 
A State is not responsible for loss of property or for other 
economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general 
taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of 
the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police 
power of States, if it is not discriminatory. . . .234 
In practice, however, in expropriation cases investment 
tribunals have often applied domestic U.S. regulatory takings 
doctrine235 in favor of investors, disregarding whether the 
regulations were a nondiscriminatory exercise of State police 
powers in their findings of breach or in their decision on the 
amount of the award. 
Thus the Tribunal in Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elana SA v. 
Costa Rica Award of 17 February 2000 concluded: 
Expropriatory environmental measures—no matter how 
laudable and beneficial to society as a whole—are in this 
respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a 
State may take in order to implement its policies: where 
property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, 
 
233 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Protocol I, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/Treaties/html/005.htm. 
234  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 
712(1), cmt. G (1987). 
235 For an exposition of the U.S. takings doctrine, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (examining the constitutionality of appellees’ 
actions via the Taking Clause). 
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whether domestic or international, the State’s obligation to 
pay compensation remains.236 
This was cited with approval by the Tribunal in the Tecmed 
case based on the Spanish-Mexican BIT.237  In a NAFTA claim, the 
Metalclad Tribunal refused to consider the motivation for a local 
government’s issuance of an ecological decree and denial of a 
permit for the operation of a waste management facility when it 
found Mexico had expropriated the investment based on a public 
service concession contract. 
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, 
deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as 
outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in 
favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental 
interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the 
use of reasonably-to-be expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the 
host State.238 
As Philippe Sands has pointed out, these results at odds with 
domestic and international environmental law stem from the 
current fragmented State of international law overall.239  National 
and international environmental laws have not been integrated 
with international economic laws while investment tribunals have 
mainly adopted a hierarchy preferring international economic 
law.240  While the international environmental norm of the 
“Polluter Pays” would favor environmental enforcement, 
investment tribunals are more likely to find an impermissible 
 
236 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v. Costa Rica (Santa Elena), 
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, para. 72 (Feb. 17, 2000). 
237  See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, para. 121 (May 29, 2003) (finding “no principle stating 
that regulatory administrative actions are per se excluded from the scope of the 
Agreement”). 
238 Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para. 
103 (Aug. 30, 2000). 
239 See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 
1070–71 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (1995) (describing the Santa Elena case). 
240  Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the 
Progressive Development of International Environmental Law, OECD GLOBAL FORUM 
ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (March 27–28, 2008), available at http://www.oecd 
.org/dataoecd/45/7/40311090.pdf. 
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barrier to trade in environmental regulation.  A good example of 
this is the SD Meyers case, which did in fact allege discriminatory 
treatment but is nonetheless remarkable for the degree to which 
trade law drove the outcome of the dispute to override 
international environmental law.  Claimants challenged a 
Canadian ban on the importation of PCBs and PCB wastes 
pursuant to Canada’s obligations under the 1989 Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal.  The investment arbitral tribunal cited WTO 
dispute panel precedents to hold that Canada’s ban was intended 
to reduce import competition from the United States and therefore 
violated the National Treatment obligation.241  The holding 
amounts to international administrative review of Canada’s 
environmental laws.242 
Where a State can achieve its chosen level of environmental 
protection through a variety of equally effective and reasonable 
means, it is obliged to adopt the alternative that is most consistent 
with open trade.  This corollary is consistent with the language and 
the case law arising from the WTO family of agreements.243 
5.1.2. Expropriation and Non-Discriminatory Regulation under 
the U.S. Model BIT 
Responding to the objections of NGOS and States, Annex B 4(b) 
of the U.S. Model BIT clarifies the scope of regulatory takings: 
(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory 
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied 
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safeties, and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriations.244 
 
241 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 
2000) paras. 258–66, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada 
_sdmyers.htm. 
242 See Klafter, supra note 226, at 419. 
243 S.D. Meyers, Inc., para. 221. 
244 Model BIT, supra note 3, Annex B(4)(b). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/5
2010] INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS 1007 
 
5.2. The Conflict between Investment Agreement Claims and Non-
discriminatory Regulation 
In an investment agreement claim, on the other hand, the treaty 
contains no express similar limitation barring claims based on non-
discriminatory regulation for the public purpose.  Neither, of 
course, would the claimant in an investment agreement claim have 
to show that she was deprived of the use of the whole or a 
significant portion of the value of the investment as in an 
expropriation claim.  At the same time, as the particular scope of 
investment agreements triggers sovereign duties for the 
stewardship of natural resources, the enforcement of the 
obligations in investment agreement claims under the DRC are 
even more likely to come into conflict with non-discriminatory 
environmental policy-making. 
The Azurix case illustrates how natural resource concessions 
easily become a flash point for conflicts between investment law 
and domestic laws for natural resources management.245 Azurix 
Corporation, a subsidiary of Enron, acquired a Concession to 
provide potable water and operate sewage treatment facilities in 
Buenos Aires.  After local water supplies became contaminated 
with toxic bacteria, the government urged the residents not to 
drink the water and to minimize exposure, imposing a fine on 
Azurix for violating the concession agreement.  Further, the water 
authorities issued regulations disallowing Azurix to bill its 
customers during the water crisis.  Azurix, arguing the bacteria 
contamination was due to the local government’s failure to provide 
agreed upon infrastructure, complained that the billing prohibition 
amounted to an expropriation and a breach of the duty of fair and 
equitable treatment under the U.S.-Argentine BIT.  Although the 
tribunal found a breach of contract in favor of the investor, because 
the investor had not been found to have been deprived in whole or 
in significant part of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected 
economic benefit of its investment, it did not find an expropriation 
had taken place.  Finding a breach of the obligation of fair and 
equitable treatment, the tribunal stressed the legitimate 
expectations of the investor at the time of entering into the 
investment as the primary consideration.246  The tribunal awarded 
 
245 Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (July 14, 2006). 
246 Id. paras. 316–23. 
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Azurix for U.S. $165 million of the more than $600 million it was 
claiming.247  Argentina has applied for an annulment. 
Kate Miles has pointed out the imminent prospective conflict 
between global-warming related regulation and international 
investment law;248 conflict is especially likely to crop up over 
investment agreements in the energy sector.  A wide array of 
activities connected to energy production and distribution are 
likely to be impacted by cap-and-trade, emissions quotas and other 
techniques for mitigation.  Inevitably, investments that produce 
large amounts of greenhouse gases will face compliance costs.  
Already, the German government faces a claim under the Energy 
Charter Treaty by the corporation Vatenfall over Kyoto Protocol 
related regulations concerning coal-based electricity production.249 
The point is not that host State governments should be given a 
blank check to enact environmental and health regulation 
regardless of its consequences for foreign investors.  Instead, I 
argue the current investment disciplines are sufficient to the task, 
and having been previously developed in the context of customary 
international law, offer more certainty in investment dispute 
resolution. 
5.3. The Chilling Effect on Environmental Regulation 
States should be permitted to incorporate advances in science 
and technology to protect local populations or join in worldwide 
efforts to combat transnational environmental problems by 
introducing new environmental regulation.  They should be 
encouraged to discharge their obligations under international 
environmental agreements.  However, investment treaties 
attaching penalties to environmental regulations make 
environmental protection legislation and enforcement a risky 
game, particularly for less developed States.  If investment treaty 
tribunals continue to follow the trends of the Metalclad, Tecmed and 
Santa Elena tribunals, disregarding the non-discriminatory purpose 
behind environmental regulations when assessing investment 
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248 Kate Miles, International Investment Law and Climate Change: Issues in the 
Transition to a Low Carbon World (Society of International Economic Law, Working 
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249 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG v. Germany, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/6 (2009). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/5
2010] INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS 1009 
 
agreement violations, the chilling effect on environmental 
regulations could be serious. 
If the investment agreement contains a stabilization clause, 
governments may become absolutely fettered in their ability to 
regulate concession agreements.  Even when an investment 
agreement does not contain a stabilization clause, host States may 
prefer not to exercise preventative measures that delay the 
implementation of a project, such as injunctions or suspension of 
licenses, for fear of legal retaliation based on foregone profits.  
Because multinationals often have resources for evasion far 
exceeding the enforcement capacities of host States, environmental 
protection in developing countries is already severely challenged.  
As one author puts it, “Besides the continued application of low 
standards for decades to come, this situation also shifts to the host 
state the risk of currently unknown social and environmental 
standards which may be discovered in future and which may be 
prevented or minimized through regulation.”250 
The norm of predictability and stability for foreign investment 
in international law is important, but it should not take absolute 
precedence over the principle that States are the representatives of 
their people within their territories.  Clearly a proper balance needs 
to be struck in international investment law between preserving 
legitimate expectations of investors and the needs of countries to 
regulate for the welfare of their public.  The problem is investment 
treaties such as the Model BIT currently lack the necessary 
precision for arbitrators to find the balance.  We should distinguish 
the situation when a State acts intentionally and deceptively to 
manipulate the machinery of government to deprive an investor of 
his property rights from those generally applied administrative 
actions that arise from demands for accountability of government 
and the true functioning of the democratic legislative process.  
Without providing tribunals with manageable guidelines for their 
implementation, the investment agreement provisions, too broadly 
construed, would easily blur such distinctions. 
5.4. A Narrow Interpretation of the Provisions for the Breach of an 
Investment Agreement 
The previous considerations call for an interpretation of the 
investment agreement provisions that accord with the customary 
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international law on the minimum standard treatment for aliens 
and respect the right of governments to regulate for the protection 
of the public welfare.  The following matrix is a suggested 
interpretation of the DRC that attempts to reconcile it with 
international customary law on contracts between aliens and 
States.  In the case that a regulation or measure in violation of the 
investment agreement is discriminatory, the law of State 
responsibility is invoked by the breach of investment agreement 
and international law is applicable to the investment agreement 
claim.  In this situation, a reasonable interpretation based on the 
total context of the dispute resolution clause would require the 
tribunal to award the value of the damage sustained to the 
underlying investment that provides the standing for the 
investment agreement claim, namely the reliance interest.251  But 
where the challenged State action is a non-discriminatory 
regulation of general application, whether recovery should be 
awarded depends on whether the regulation falls within the scope 
of a valid stabilization clause in the investment agreement. 
Although a discussion of the validity of stabilization clauses 
under international law is beyond the scope of this Article, some 
relevant considerations in determining whether a stabilization 
clause is valid could be:  (1) the length of the period; (2) the degree 
of restrictions on state autonomy in policy making (whether it 
stabilizes the legislative framework or the economic equilibrium of 
the agreement); and (3) whether the stabilization clause has been 
otherwise legitimized by specific legislative decrees referring to the 
commitment (validity under domestic law).  Finally, even if the 
investment agreement has a valid stabilization clause, when the 
breach of the stabilization clause is due to non-discriminatory 
exercise of police powers, the proper measure of damages would 
depend on that specified on the face of the investment agreement 
or in the host State’s contracting laws rather than that awarded 
under the treaty’s award clause. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This Article has discussed the origins and implications of the 
procedural framework for the arbitration of investment 
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agreements under the 2004 U.S. Model BIT from both legal and 
policy perspectives.  Under the U.S. Model BIT framework for the 
arbitration of investment agreement claims, a range of government 
administrative actions within the prerogative of States to regulate 
for public health and welfare could become forms of compensable 
liability for host States that are currently not considered to be 
violations under customary international law.  Government 
measures in the field of environmental enforcement and natural 
resources management are particularly likely to become sources of 
liability for host States.  The investment agreement provisions of 
dispute resolution clause, broadly interpreted, open alternative 
avenues for investors to claim extensive damage awards against 
the public sector for breaches of obligations in concession contracts 
that are not contemplated in the public contracting laws of the 
States.  As such, they are likely to chill legislation in the field of 
environmental protection and hinder the enforcement of existing 
national, regional and international environmental laws.  
Accordingly, in this Article I have argued for a narrow 
construction of the investment agreement claims provisions to 
reduce the tension with environmental enforcement, and to 
reconcile the provisions with customary international law and 
investment arbitration precedents. 
 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
